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FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE USER RIGHT*
HAOCHEN SUN**

This Article puts forward a new theory that reconceptualizesfair
use as a collective user right in copyright law. It first argues that
the fair use doctrine has not yet unleashed its full potential in
protecting the public interest. The failure is caused by a firmly
ingrained notion in copyright law that treats fair use as an
affirmative defense
against allegations of copyright
infringements. Such a fixed characterization of fair use has led
legislators and judges to define it as merely an individual right
enjoyed by each user of copyrighted works. This characterization
has also lead to a wide range of harms to the public interest in the
free flow of informationand knowledge.
Against this backdrop, this Article explores the ways in which
fair use can be revitalized to protect the public interest. It argues
for repudiatingthe narrow-mindedcharacterizationof fair use as
an individual right. It then proposes that fair use should instead
be redefined as a collective right held by the public, which
facilitates and enhances participation in communicative actions
in what I call intangible public space. From this perspective,
section 107 of the Copyright Act should be read as conferring a
collective right to fair use upon members of the public.
Moreover, this Article shows the power of the collective right to
fair use in generating a new legal approach that will enrich
copyright adjudication and policy-making discourse for
protecting the public interest in the digitalage.
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The progress of arts and sciences and the robust public debate
essential to an enlightened citizenry are ill served by [the]
constricted readingof the fair use doctrine.
-Justice

William Brennan 1

As copyright continues its apparently unstoppable expansion in
scope, duration,and strength,fair use seems unable to rise to the
challenge of preserving a vibrant space in which people are free
to "tinker" with or recode copyrighted works.

-Mark

Lemley, Stanford Law School2

INTRODUCTION

As a limitation on copyright, fair use allows the public to make
limited use of copyrighted works without permission from copyright
holders. Fair use is of vital importance in a free and just society. 3 It
not only accommodates but also encourages a wide range of freedom-

promoting activities that involve using copyrighted works for
purposes such as news reporting, criticism, teaching, and research.4

1. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 185, 185 (internal citations omitted).
3. See Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?:
Evidence From the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008) (pointing
out that the fair use doctrine defines "the contours of the private and public domains of
human expression and, in doing so, directly impact[s] our capability for human
flourishing"); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 43-47 (2001) (discussing the social
functions of fair use); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1988) (arguing that the fair use doctrine "would contribute to
the realization of a more just social order"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market
Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002) (discussing the two competing
public values in fair use cases); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009) ("A well-recognized strength of the fair use doctrine is the
considerable flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of copyright owners in
controlling exploitations of their works and the interests of subsequent authors in drawing
from earlier works when expressing themselves, as well as the interests of the public in
having access to new works and making reasonable uses of them.").
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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As a result, fair use has been hailed as a "free speech safeguard" 5 in
copyright law and the engine of social creativity.6

Yet the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright protection
may have jeopardized the positive role played by the fair use
doctrine. 7 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 8 for

example, introduces a de facto elimination of fair use if copyright
holders deploy technological measures to restrict access to and use of
their works. Thus, the DMCA is widely believed to have undercut the
public's fair use privilege. 9 Moreover, many courts have interpreted

the fair use doctrine based on an individualistic vision of property
rights, thereby turning a blind eye to the larger public interest in
promoting the free flow of knowledge and information. 10
Commentators, therefore, have whimsically lamented that fair use has
been treated as "the step-child of copyright law" in these copyright
holder-centered rulings." The combination of the legislative and

5. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a
"free speech safeguard[]" and a "First Amendment accommodation[]"); Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 560 ("[Tlhe First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright
Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas,
and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.").
6. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) ("From the
infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts ......."(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8)).
7. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 54-80 (2008);

Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 412-46 (1999); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 37-49.
8. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 146-59; see also Gideon Parchomovsky &
Phillip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94 (2010) (arguing that the
DMCA "significantly limit[s] the scope of fair use for copyrighted works in digital media
... [and does] not grant users fair use privileges").
10. See infra text accompanying notes 94-120; see also NETANEL, supra note 7, at 6266 (discussing the Blackstonian property-centered view of fair use that has been widely
used by courts); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 548 (2004) ("Unfortunately, courts'
understanding of fair use has restricted both fair use and the First Amendment, so that
each seems to serve a single overriding value of protecting criticism rather than promoting
the multiple values served by different kinds of copying and different kinds of speech. In
particular, a vision of free speech that finds copyright unobjectionable as long as a fair use
defense is available ignores the value of participating by affirming or agreeing with
someone else's words.").
11. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (1997) ("The overemphasis on
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judicial expansions of copyright protection, therefore, has made the
fair use doctrine "an exceedingly feeble, inconstant check on
copyright holders' proprietary control."' 2 Meanwhile, many copyright
holders,

especially

entertainment

conglomerates,

have

been

aggressively enforcing their rights. They have stepped up their
lobbying efforts in order to have more laws enacted in favor of

stronger proprietary control of copyrighted works. 'I
Indeed, all these copyright holder-centered developments have

brought about what I call a "legitimization crisis" for copyright law in
general and fair use in particular. Debates have raged; outcries
against copyright expansions have abounded. 4 Against this backdrop,
this Article argues that the failure of the fair use doctrine to unleash

its full potential in protecting the public interest lies in a firmly
ingrained notion in copyright law that treats fair use as an affirmative
defense against allegations of copyright infringements. 5 Such a fixed
characterization of fair use has led legislators and judges to define fair
monetary issues and permission systems by lower courts deciding fair use cases without
full consideration of the external benefits of the use at issue has led judges to treat fair use
as the step-child of copyright law.").
12. NETANEL, supra note 7, at 63; see also DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST

AMENDMENT 97 (2009)

(arguing that "the fair use doctrine today is altogether
inadequate"); Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and
Religious Pluralism,91 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 329 (2003) (noting a "shrinking doctrine of fair
use"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 546 (1996) ("As Congress and various courts have expanded the
scope of the author's protected interest, so too have they narrowed the scope of the fair
use doctrine.").
13. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-76 (2001) (explaining how
larger entertainment corporations often exert substantial influence on copyright
legislation); Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay-How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 65-67 (2002) (discussing several recent legislative efforts that
have increased copyright protections for larger entertainment organizations); Jessica
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 314-15
(1989) ("Much legislation advances the agendas of private interest groups .... Congress in
effect agreed that if the industry representatives would invest the time and energy to
develop a bill that all of them endorsed, Congress would refrain from exercising
independent judgment on the substance of the legislation.").
14. For a succinct description of the debates, see generally JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 42-82 (2008); WILLIAM W.
III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 134-72 (2004); Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2009) [hereinafter Litman, Politics]; Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating
Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
FISHER

15. See infra Part I; see also Samuelson, supra note 3, at 2539 ("Fair use has been
invoked as a defense to claims of copyright infringement in a wide array of cases over the
past thirty years.").
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use as merely an individual right enjoyed by each user of copyrighted
works. This characterization has also lead to a wide range of harms to
the public interest in the free flow of information and knowledge. 6
This Article explores the ways in which fair use can be revitalized
to protect the public interest. It first repudiates the narrow-minded
characterization of fair use as a mere individual right. It then

proposes that fair use should instead be redefined as a collective right
held by the public to facilitate and enhance participation in
communicative actions in what I call "intangible public space."' 7
From this perspective, section 107 of the Copyright Act should be

read as conferring a collective right to fair use upon members of the
public. This Article further shows the power of the collective right to

fair use in generating a new legal approach that will enrich copyright
adjudication and policy-making discourse for protecting the public
interest in the digital age.
Moreover, this Article will show that the collective rights
approach to protecting the public's fair use interests has the merit of

addressing the following three dilemmas that have loomed large in
copyright law in general and the fair use doctrine in particular. The
first dilemma concerns why constitutional requirements have failed to
deter an unprecedented expansion of copyright protection at the
expense of the public interest. Indeed, many commentators and
public interest activists are very enthusiastic and hopeful about the
invocation of the Copyright Clause 8 or the First Amendment to
counter and invalidate overly strong protection of copyright." Yet
Eldred v. Ashcroft"0 dealt a direct blow to these approaches. The
Supreme Court adamantly denied the claim that either the Copyright

Clause or the First Amendment was a bar to the recent twenty-year
expansion of copyright terms.2' Courts have reached similar holdings
16. See infra text accompanying notes 121-41.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 178-92.
18. The Copyright Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
8.
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
19. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 7, at 169 (proposing that copyright law should be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000)
("The point remains the same: in an age of increasing 'statutorification' in intellectual
property law, the system needs a counterweight where the legislative process is skewed.
The [Copyright] Clause of the [Clonstitution, long dormant, seems the best candidate.").
20. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
21. Id. at 221. For a comprehensive critique of the Court's reasoning in Eldred, see
Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 265, 320-22, 327-28 (2007).
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in a series of similar copyright cases in which the invocation of the
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment failed to protect the public
22
interest in fair use.
Against this backdrop, this Article will demonstrate that a
collective right-based theory of fair use, if introduced into copyright
law, can become an effective tool to invalidate the socially unsound

expansion of copyright protection. It would further function to
revitalize the waning public interest-oriented tradition in copyright
adjudication 23 and policymaking. 24 From this perspective, the
collective right-based theory of fair use proposed in this Article goes
beyond the reach of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
But it by no means follows that the theory would totally supplant

those constitutional provisions. Instead, the theory acts to support the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment by creating a new legal

approach for dealing with fair use cases. Put differently, the collective
right-based theory of fair use would prompt courts to fulfill their
judicial responsibilities to champion the cause of the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment, and, further, to avoid rendering
Eldred-type decisions.
There exists a second dilemma in copyright law: how to define
the nature of users' rights. Recently there has been a burgeoning of

literature discussing this topic in the context of copyright's adaptation
to advances in digital technology. 25 Commentators contend that
22. See infra Part II.B-C.
23. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' .. . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work." (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8)). Similar conclusions can be found in other cases. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) ("The enactment of copyright legislation
by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that
the author has in his writings ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.").
25. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
347, 373 (2005) ("[F]ailure to consider the user both legitimates judicially driven elision
and encourages right holders and technology developers to ignore the user as a matter of
practice."). See generally Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (Michael Geist
ed., 2005) (discussing the integral role of the user in Canadian copyright law under a
recent court decision); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the
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copyright law needs to embrace the notion of users' rights and adopt
an improved set of legal rules for protecting those rights. It seems that
commentators still define those rights as individual rights that enable
users to assert their own individual interests under copyright law.
However, fair use, as this Article will show, has long been employed
to afford and protect individual rights of fair users.26 Thus, there has
been no lack of recognition and accommodation of the notion of
users' rights in copyright law.
This Article argues that what has been lacking in copyright law's
embrace of users' rights is a vision that wholeheartedly treats users as
the bearers of a dynamic set of collective rights. It considers why a
collective right-based theory of fair use would function to help
copyright law to deliver its potential to serve as the "engine of free
expression."27 The theory, moreover, would broaden our vision of the
public interest in knowledge and information by regarding fair use as
a collective user right. It therefore has the potential of offering a
creative and dynamic interpretation of the nature and scope of the
fair use doctrine for copyright adjudication and policy debate.
The third dilemma pertains to the ways in which the public's
engagement can be mobilized at different stages of copyright
discourse. The courts have become complacent in protecting user
interests in copyright law. Judges typically regard certain
conventional copyright doctrines, particularly the fair use doctrine, as
effective legal tools that afford adequate protection of users' interests.
That is, courts have assumed that copyright law itself contains
adequate safeguards to protect and promote the public interest in the
free flow of knowledge and information. 28 Such complacency,
however, has led to the problem of public under-participation in the
process of making copyright law and policy. Commentators have used
DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119 (2007) (proposing a consumer-as-participant

perspective that addresses consumer interests in copyright analysis); Wendy J. Gordon &
Daniel Bahls, The Public's Rights to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the "Fared
Use" Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619 (rejecting the notion that, because recent
technology has lowered transaction-cost barriers between copyright owner and putative
user, fair use is no longer necessary); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1871 (2007) (noting that the zone of lawful personal use is shrinking); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003) (proposing a new
image of the copyright consumer that takes into account multiple consumer interests).
26. See infra Part II.A-B.
27. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
28. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003) (concluding that fair use
and idea/expression doctrines are "generally adequate" to establish a "definitional
balance" between copyright and the First Amendment).
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ideas such as the public domain

9

and cultural ecosystems

133
30

as

metaphors to demonstrate that there is in effect no room for
complacency of this kind. Despite the existence of fair use, the recent
unprecedented expansion of copyright protection has shrunk the

public domain of information and knowledge and jeopardized our
cultural ecosystems for innovation and creativity.
These metaphors are powerful in awakening the public. Yet they

do not provide an appropriate status for the public as users in the
framework of copyright law. In other words, what remains
unanswered is the question of what kind of rights the public has with
regard to the knowledge and information embodied in copyrighted

works.3 Without such an answer, fair use will remain feeble in
defending the public interest.
Responding to this need, this Article shows that the collective
right-based theory of fair use would create new ways to increase

public awareness of the importance of protecting the free flow of
knowledge and information. Moreover, the theory has the advantage
of mobilizing more members of the public to actively engage in policy

discourse regarding how the ownership of knowledge and information

29. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating
the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE
COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006)
(defining the term "public domain" and discussing the effect of commodification on the
public domain); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1981, at 147 (arguing for stronger recognition of individual rights in the public
domain); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (exploring the
history of the "public domain" concept and critiquing the current theoretical justifications
of the term); Tyler T. Ochoa, Originsand Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 215 (2003) (discussing the history and development of the term "public domain");
Conference, The Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 1
(discussing the role of the public domain in intellectual property law); Pamela Samuelson,
Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (discussing various
scholarly definitions of the term "public domain"). For further discussion of public domain
theory, see infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
30. See generally James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism
for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) (explaining the idea of "cultural property" and how it
can help strengthen public participation in the making of copyright law); James Boyle,
Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 5
(introducing the concept of "cultural environmentalism" and explaining how it can help
increase public participation in making copyright law).
31. For example, David Fagundes argues that "talking about shared IP entitlements
using the language of ownership promises not only to access the deeply instinctive
attachment to property we all share, but to redirect the emotional force of that attachment
in the direction of public as well as private resources." David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric
and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,658 (2010).
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should be allocated.32 A focus on collective rights has the potential to
show the general public its stake in our intangible public space. In this
sense, the theory would buttress the principles embedded in the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause by engaging more citizens to
participate directly or indirectly in the making of copyright policies or
laws.
Part I of this Article first examines the major cases and
legislative documents that have defined fair use as an affirmative
defense against copyright infringement allegations. Part II reveals
that such a characterization inevitably reduces fair use to an
individual right for users under copyright law. It further discusses how
and why this individual right-based approach has caused a variety of
harms to the public interest in the free flow of knowledge and
information. Part III puts forward a new theory reconceptualizing fair
use as a collective user right. It discusses why users of copyrighted
works should be conferred with the collective right to fair use. It
demonstrates that users' collective right to participate in intangible
public space provides the theoretical foundation to redefine fair use
as a collective right. This Article further discusses how this new vision
of fair use would generate a new legal approach that will protect the
public interest. It also shows how the new vision would further lead to
a more balanced approach to dealing with the many thorny issues that
arise in the process of copyright adjudication or policymaking.
I. FAIR USE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The fair use doctrine stemmed from an array of judicial decisions
on copyright disputes. Courts used the doctrine as a limitation on the
exclusive rights conferred upon copyright holders, exempting users
from being held liable for copyright infringement as long as they
could prove the existence of fair use.3 3 Drawing on past judicial
decisions, Congress codified the fair use doctrine into the Copyright
Act in 1976.1' Section 107 of the Copyright Act defines the scope and
nature of the doctrine as follows:
32. For discussion on the importance of engaging more public participation in shaping
and reshaping intellectual property laws, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge
Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (2008)
(discussing the role of the "access to knowledge" movement in developing "a shared
identity and a common critique of the existing intellectual property system").
33. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 3, at 2539 ("Fair use has been invoked as a
defense to claims of copyright infringement in a wide array of cases ... ").
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3
(2d ed. 1995) ("Fair use, as it presently exists, evolved by a process of accretion from
holdings and dicta in a variety of contexts .... ").

2011]

FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE USER RIGHT

135

§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.35
Section 107 defines the fair use doctrine as a limitation on the
exclusive rights conferred upon copyright holders. This limitation
allows the public to use copyrighted materials without obtaining
permission or paying a fee to the copyright holder. Section 107
explains how the fair use doctrine should be applied in practice.36 It
first lists six illustrative types of uses of copyrighted materials that
would potentially be deemed fair: criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research.
The second part of section 107 requires courts to decide fair use
cases by using the four factors. These four factors for measuring
whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work may be
considered fair are widely recognized as the core of section 107. 37 The
third part of section 107 was added in 1990. It made clear that an
35. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
36. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5109, 5679
("Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.").
37. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582-621 (2008) (analyzing how courts have focused on
and applied the four fair use factors).
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unauthorized use of an unpublished work would not necessarily
amount to copyright infringement.38
The broad language used in section 107 of the Copyright Act

only reveals that fair use functions as a limitation on the exclusive
rights conferred upon copyright holders. It does not, however, clear
away all the uncertainty. The legislative history of section 107 shows

that Congress did not intend to shape the doctrine as a set of "brightline rules" 39 for courts. In practice, courts have developed
inconsistent, and even conflicting, approaches to applying the
doctrine, 4° making the outcomes of fair use cases deeply unstable and
unpredictable. 4 Despite the persistent uncertainty lingering around

the fair use doctrine,42 fair use has uniformly been treated as an
affirmative defense. The fact that fair use is an affirmative defense

38. H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2561.
("This sentence has a narrow, but important purpose: to reiterate Congress's intention in
codifying fair use that in evaluating a claim of fair use, including claims involving
unpublished works, the courts are to examine all four statutory factors set forth in Section
107, as well as any other factors deemed relevant in the court's discretion.").
39. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31
(1984) (noting that Congress "eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use"). The
Supreme has consistently affirmed the Sony opinion in this respect. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (pointing out that "[t]he task [of section
107] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A], at 13-159 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011)
(1963) (arguing that nothing in section 107 provides "a rule that may automatically be
applied in deciding whether any particular use is 'fair' ").
40. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) ("[Tlhe issue of
fair use, which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.").
41. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 66 (2008) ("Given the doctrine's open-ended, casespecific cast and inconsistent application, it is exceedingly difficult to predict whether a
given use in a given case will qualify."); Beebe, supra note 37, at 574 (arguing that "fair use
case law is especially unstable"); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 429 (2007) ("The fair use doctrine is, if anything, even more
uncertain in scope. It is a multi-factor, equitable defense that gives much discretion to
courts. Outcomes are often difficult to predict with any degree of certainty."); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007)
("[S]cholars generally agree that it is now virtually impossible to predict the outcome of
fair use cases."); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign FinanceReform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000) ("After decades of litigation,
it is still difficult to tell when and whether one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even
for scientific research.").
42. For a comprehensive discussion about the indeterminacy problem inherent in
copyright law in general and fair use in particular, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-906 (2007); Sun,
supra note 21, at 303-11.
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has profoundly informed how the four factors listed in section 107 are
applied in judicial practice.
The notion of fair use as an affirmative defense was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc.
43 In that case, The Nation magazine published
v. Nation Enterprises.

some 300 words of verbatim quotes from former President Ford's
500-page memoir. The Court said that Congress "structured [fair use]
as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis."' This
definition of fair use, the Court held, stemmed from the fact that
section 107 was not meant to provide any presumptive categories of
fair use.45 Simply by asserting use of a copyrighted work for the news

reporting purpose, which is categorized as an example of fair use in
section 107, does not automatically exempt the user from proving that
his use can satisfy the four fair use factors listed in section 107. Thus,
Harper & Row implied that it is incumbent on a user to prove that his
use of copyrighted materials is fair within the ambit of section 107.
Lower courts later cited Harper & Row as authority for settling the
issue as to which party should bear the burden of proving fair use.46
However, in College Entrance Examination Board v. Cuomo, 7

the District Court for the Northern District of New York deviated
from the Supreme Court's Harper & Row decision. It held that it is
the copyright holder rather than the user who should have the burden
of proving fair use:
Section 107 states in pertinent part that "[t]he fair use of a
copyrighted work ...is not an infringement of copyright."

Therefore, in order to demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on
the merits of its copyright infringement claim, [the copyright
holder] must show that the [user's] use of its test forms is not a
fair use.48

43. 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see PATRY, supra note 34, at 585 (pointing out that Harper &
Row "definitively settled the issue" regarding whether or not fair use is an affirmative
defense).
44. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
45. Id. ("[Section 107's] listing was not intended to be exhaustive ... or to single out
any particular use as presumptively a 'fair' use.").
46. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 881 (N.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The drafters of Section 107
viewed the fair use exception to the Copyright Act as an affirmative defense; the party
asserting the exception, therefore, bears the burden of production and persuasion to show
that the exception applies.").
47. 788 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
48. Id. at 140 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
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The court based this opinion on the preamble of section 107, which
starts with the statement that fair use is not an infringement of
copyright. It seems that the court reasoned that since section 107 had
excluded fair use as a non-infringement of copyright, there was no
need for the user in that case to prove the existence of fair use.
Therefore, the court said the copyright holder had the responsibility
to prove that there was no fair use. Yet, the court added a footnote to
make this opinion only applicable to cases in which the copyright
holder seeks a preliminary injunction. The court stated in the
footnote that where the copyright holder seeks a preliminary
injunction, he should bear the burden to demonstrate49 that the
unauthorized use of his work does not constitute a fair use.
Congress later repudiated the College Entrance Examination

Board decision. In 1992, Congress explicitly affirmed the Harper &
Row opinion by deciding that fair use only affords users with an
affirmative defense when copyright holders establish a prima facie
case of copyright infringement. For example, in elaborating on the
reasons for inserting an additional provision in section 107, the House
Judiciary Committee report explained as follows:
Fair use is an affirmative defense, and as such is relevant only
after a copyright owner has made out a prima facie case of
infringement. A prima facie case of infringement consists of
ownership of the right asserted and unauthorized appropriation
by the defendant of a material amount of expression. The
copying of facts or of a de minimis amount of expression will
not support a prima facie case of infringement. Fair use thus
excuses the copying of a material amount of expression, with
the test of materiality involving both quantitative and
qualitative inquiries.5 °
This passage of the report shows that as an affirmative defense, fair
use only exempts users from liability if they can furnish evidence to
convince courts that their unauthorized uses of copyrighted works
amount to fair use. Moreover, the report further criticized the College

49. Id. at 140 n.7 ("[The plaintiff] cites this court's decision in [Ass'n of American
Medical Colleges v. Carey] to support its assertion that the party claiming fair use has 'the
burden of production and persuasion to show that the exception applies.' However, the
court made that statement in connection with a motion for summary judgment. In the
present case, [the plaintiff] is seeking preliminary relief and therefore it bears the burden
to demonstrate the likelihood that it will prevail on this claim." (quoting Ass'n of Am.
Med. Coils., 788 F. Supp. at 881)).
50. H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 & n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553,
2554.

2011]

FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE USER RIGHT

139

Entrance Examination Board decision, objecting to the placement of
the burden of proof on the copyright holder in fair use cases where
the copyright holder seeks a preliminary injunction: "The College
Entrance Examination Board opinion is contrary to the statute and
the Supreme Court's Harper & Row opinion: the burden of proving
fair use is always on the party asserting the defense, regardless of the
type of relief sought by the copyright owner."'"
The notion of fair use as an affirmative defense was fully
established after the Harper & Row opinion and Congress's
legislative report, both of which were cited approvingly in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,5 a seminal fair use decision issued by the
Supreme Court in 1994. In Campbell, the Court ruled that the musical
group 2 Live Crew's appropriation of certain elements of Roy
Orbison's song "Pretty Woman" in its parody of the song constituted
a fair use. The Court made it clear that "[s]ince fair use is an
affirmative defense, its proponent would have ... the burden of
demonstrating fair use."53
Moreover, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the definition of fair
use as an affirmative defense in Eldred v. Ashcroft. In Eldred, the
Supreme Court addressed, among other things, whether the fair use
doctrine could invalidate the twenty-year extension of the duration of
copyright protection that was triggered by the passage of the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.54 Thus, the Court needed to
interpret the nature of the fair use doctrine before it could proceed to
make a decision regarding the extension of the copyright terms. By
citing both Harper& Row and Campbell, the Court affirmed that fair
use should be treated as an affirmative defense:
[Tihe "fair use" defense allows the public to use not only facts
and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression
itself in certain circumstances.... The fair use defense affords
considerable "latitude for scholarship and comment," and even
for parody .... 11
Although the Eldred decision was rendered after the Harper &
Row and Campbell decisions, it clarified and reinforced the legal basis
for holding fair use to be an affirmative defense. This is because
51. Id.
52. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
53. Id. at 590.
54. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003).
55. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 531, 560 (1985)) (emphases added).
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Eldred further elevated fair use to a constitutionally required
affirmative defense that must be made viable in copyright law.56
Before Eldred, the constitutional status of fair use remained
unsettled. For example, the Second Circuit in Universal City Studios
v. Corley57 questioned whether fair use had any constitutional basis by

asserting that "the Supreme Court has never held that fair use is
constitutionally required, although some isolated statements in its
opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement. 5 8 In
contrast, Eldred made clear that it is a constitutional mandate to
maintain fair use as an affirmative defense, since fair use is a "built-in
First Amendment"59 safeguard against undue restrictions on speechrelated activities.
In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 6 however, the

Eleventh Circuit departed from the conventional definition of fair
use. In a footnote, it argued that fair use should be regarded as a
user's right rather than a mere affirmative defense:
[F]air use should be considered an affirmative right under the
1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is
defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright.
However, fair use is commonly referred to as an affirmative
defense, and, as we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, we
will apply it as such. Nevertheless, the fact that the fair use right
must be procedurally asserted as an affirmative defense does
not detract from its constitutional significance as a guarantor to
access and use for First Amendment purposes.6 '

56. See id. (explaining that copyright law contains "built-in First Amendment
accommodations" including the affirmative defense of fair use); Stephen M. McJohn,
Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalizationof Fair
Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 107 (2003).
57. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
58. Id. at 458.
59. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (explaining the First Amendment safeguards embedded in
copyright law).
60. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
61. Id. at 1260 n.3 (internal citations omitted). In this footnote, the judge cited
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996), which also defined fair use as a
right:
Although the traditional approach is to view "fair use" as an affirmative defense,
this writer, speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a
right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976. Originally, as a judicial doctrine
without any statutory basis, fair use was an infringement that was excused-this is
presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a statutory doctrine, however, fair
use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should
no longer be considered an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view
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Suntrust is an outlier, however. Harper & Row and Campbell are

controlling authorities defining fair use,6' and both decisions have
been routinely cited by commentators as the authority for
entrenching fair use as an affirmative defense in the American legal
system.63 Also, they have been consistently cited by lower courts as
the authority for defining fair use and allocating burden of proof in
fair use cases.M6 Both decisions were also cited approvingly by Eldred,
65
a decision handed down by the Supreme Court after Suntrust.
The acceptance of fair use as an affirmative defense also has

gone beyond the legislature, the judiciary, and academia, and has
extended to users at large, leading to an environment in which there
is no active assertion of fair use as a user right by the public at large.

The Stanford Copyright & Fair Use Center, a think tank well known
for its fair use guidelines for the public, has defined fair use as an
affirmative defense.66 Many educational institutions have followed

this approach. For instance, the Office of the General Counsel at
Yale University educates its students and professors on fair use issues

by informing them that fair use is an affirmative defense. 67 Therefore,
the public at large has become accustomed to the affirmative defense
fair use as a right. Regardless of how fair use is viewed, it is clear that the burden
of proving fair use is always on the putative infringer.
Id. at 1542 n.22; see also NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Jacobs, J., concurring) ("Fair use is not a doctrine that exists by sufferance, or that is
earned by good works and clean morals; it is a right-codified in § 107 and recognized
since shortly after the Statute of Anne-that is 'necessary to fulfill copyright's very
purpose, "[t]o promote the Progress of science and the useful arts .... '.... (alteration in
original) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994))).
62. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1260 n.3.
63. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 12.11[F] at 12-217 (explaining
that a fair user bears the burden of proof to show that a use is fair).
64. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003)
("The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense .... ");
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp.
409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
65. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
66. See What is Fair Use?, STANFORD U. LIBR. (2010), http://fairuse.stanford.edu
/Copyright andFairUseOverview/chapter9/9-a.html.
("[F]air use is a defense against infringement. If your use qualifies under the definition
above, and as defined more specifically in this section, then your use would not be
considered an illegal infringement.").
67. See YALE OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, FAIR USE ANALYSIS TOOL 1 (2008),
available at http://ogc.yale.edu/legal-reference/pdf/Fair-Use-Tool-Website.pdf; see also
Definitions of Words and Phrases Commonly Found in Licensing Agreements, YALE U.
LIBR., http://www.library.yale.edu/-llicense/definiti.shtml
(last updated May 2008)
(defining fair use as an affirmative defense).
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approach and has not yet actively asserted the fair use right as
suggested in Suntrust.
II. FAIR USE AS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
The preceding Part showed that treating fair use as an
affirmative defense has taken deep roots in American copyright law.
However, questions still remain as to why fair use has been uniformly
defined as an affirmative defense. Judicial decisions on fair use cases
shed little light on this point. Nor do the legislative reports and
academic treatises.68
To address this quandary, this Part argues that underlying the
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense is a commitment
to defining fair use as an individual right of users. The individual
right-based approach has led courts to treat fair use cases as involving
the conflict between two individual rights, namely the plaintiff's
copyright and the defendant's right to fair use.
IndividualRights and Conflicts of Rights in Copyright Law
In the realm of rights discourse, individual rights are bestowed
upon persons primarily for the purpose of promoting their dignity and
self-worth as individual human beings. The recognition of individual
rights represents an effort to afford an institutional protection of
personal freedom enjoyed by individuals. From this perspective,
individual rights protect personal freedom in making choices for selfactualization and individual life plans.69
The tradition of liberalism, especially its prioritizing of individual
liberty and freedom, 70 lays the foundation for the legal protection of

A.

68. See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1788 (2010) ("Tellingly, in neither Harper & Row, the 1992
Judiciary Committee Report, nor Campbell does any substantive reason appear to support
labeling fair use an affirmative defense.").
69. See

DAVID

E.

BERNSTEIN,

REHABILITATING

LOCHNER:

DEFENDING

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 13 (2011) (emphasizing the

importance of "the power and obligation
deemed essential to American liberty");
GROUP PRIVACY 70 (2004) (noting that
liberty, like others such as the right
[A]mendment").

to enforce all fundamental individual rights
EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND
an "individual right, or aspect of individual
of property, is protected by the [F]ifth

70. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("Individual

rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some
reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or
injury upon them.").
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individual rights as forms of negative liberty71 against undesirable
interferences from other individuals or the government. Individual
rights such as property rights72 and privacy rights7 3 carry the legal
force to prevent or stop undesirable interference from others in order
to safeguard what a person decides to do in his or her private space.
They also act as a check on governmental power-individual rights
protect against governmental abuse of power that is harmful to
personal enjoyment of freedom.7 4
Copyright is an individual right conferred on the creators of
copyrighted works. It gives creators moral rights to prevent or stop
activities that damage the integrity of the creative process.75 It also
gives creators a bundle of economic rights by entitling them to have
exclusive control over the exploitation of the economic value of their
works. 6 By furnishing protection of the bundle of economic rights,
modern copyright law relieves creators from financial reliance on
individual or state patronage, which otherwise might unduly influence
the ways in which they express their own ideas and opinions. With the
71. When it comes to the relationship between the government and personal liberty,
negative liberty refers to freedom without undue interference from the government.
Positive liberty deals with freedom derived from governmental plans and actions. See
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 166,169-81 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
72. The Fifth Amendment states, among other things, that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Various guarantees [provided
in the Constitution] create zones of privacy.").
74. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of
Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1987) ("When we speak of constitutional
protection for property rights, we think first of keeping, not having--of negative claims
against interference with holdings, not positive claims to endowments or shares. Thus, we
primarily understand property in its constitutional sense as an antiredistributive principle,
opposed to governmental interventions into the extant regime of holdings for the sake of
distributive ends."); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American
Legal History, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1984) ("Along with individual (personal)
rights, such as those protected by the Bill of Rights, vested property rights were claims
against government; they defined a zone of private action and uses of property into which
governmental authority could not be allowed to penetrate."); see also David Abraham,
Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a "Negative Citizenship"
Regime, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 3 (1996) ("[B]y limiting political authority and the
very scope of politics itself, the American system aims to allow maximum opportunity for
individual flourishing.").
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) ("Rights of certain authors to attribution and
integrity."); see also ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:
FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 6 (2010) ("[M]oral rights
focus on inspirational motivations and the intrinsic dimension of creativity; attribution and
integrity rights are protected because they are regarded as integral components of a
work's meaning and message as conceived by the original author.").
76. See § 106 ("Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.").
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securing of their economic independence, creators are supposed to
produce and disseminate works that reflect their own independent
thoughts.77

Copyright law, however, is not solely focused on protecting the
rights of creators of copyrighted works. Rather, it is a balancing
system that provides protection for exclusive rights but also imposes a
set of limitations on those exclusive rights, such as fair use and
compulsory licensing schemes." These limitations are, by nature,
designed to ensure that users have access to copyrighted materials so
they can exercise their rights to freedom of expression, education, and
cultural participation. " For example, a parodist can affirmatively
exercise the right to freedom of expression only if his or her parody
can " 'conjure up' the original [work] in order to parody it."80 By
allowing parodies to constitute fair use, copyright law limits the
copyright holder's exclusive rights in order to protect the parodist's
right to freedom of expression.
Without copyright limitations, the promotion and protection of
users' rights cannot be achieved. Users may not be able to get
authorization for use because copyright holders may deem users'
activities, such as criticizing or parodying their works, harmful to their
interests. In other circumstances, even if copyright holders are willing
to give authorization, they may rely upon the exclusive rights over
their works to charge users prohibitively high fees for use. Either the
lack of authorization for use or the imposition of an exorbitant license
fee would make it impossible for users to have access to, or make use
of, copyright materials."1
In copyright law, it is not easy to achieve a balanced protection
of both creators' exclusive rights and users' access or use rights.
77. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 288 (1996) (arguing that copyright protection functions to support "a sector of
creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy,
elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy").
78. The Copyright Act contains various forms of compulsory licenses. For example,
section 115 of the Copyright Act provides for the acquisition of a compulsory license from
copyright holders for making and distributing phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West
Supp. 2011).
79. Sun, supra note 21, at 312-15 (discussing the range of users' rights that need to be
protected by copyright law).
80. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 573 (1994) (quoting Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)).
81. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, FairUse As Market Failure:A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (1982)
(interpreting fair use as "a mode of judicial response to market failure in the copyright
context").
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Rather, copyright law is rife with conflicts between these two
competing rights.82 A copyright holder may assert that his exclusive
rights are sufficiently broad to prevent any users from using his work,
and therefore users should be held liable for their unauthorized uses.
Meanwhile, a user may counter the copyright holder's claim by
arguing that he has a right to use the work in a way that constitutes a
fair use, and therefore he should be exempted from liability. In fair
use cases, courts thus need to decide which party's claim carries more
weight and prevails over the other party's claim.
B.

Affirmative Defense as an Individual Right

As shown in the preceding Part, courts have used the affirmative
defense approach to deal with the conflict of rights between a
copyright holder and a user in a fair use case. This Section
demonstrates that by treating fair use as an affirmative defense,
courts have defined fair use as the user's individual right. In this way,
fair use merely affords each user a right to raise the fair use defense in
copyright disputes.
1. Assertion of Personal Interests by Users
Affirmative defenses, either in criminal or civil procedure, are
designed to protect the personal interests of those who appear before
courts as defendants. Self-defense, for instance, is a typical affirmative
defense in criminal or civil cases. A defendant may be exonerated if
he can demonstrate that he had an honest and reasonable belief that
another's use of force was unlawful and that his own conduct was
necessary to protect himself.83 For this purpose, the defendant needs
to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his conduct was
necessitated by the need to safeguard his body or life when he was
82. For discussion regarding the conflict of rights in copyright law, see Sun, supra note
21, at 303-11; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Copyright law
... must address the inevitable tension between the property rights it establishes in
creative works, which must be protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists,
and the rest of us to express them-or ourselves by reference to the works of others, which
must be protected up to a point."); L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 207 (1991) ("[T]o serve the public

welfare copyright must accommodate two often conflicting, private interests-the
copyright owner's right to economic rewards for disseminating a work to the public, and
the user's right to employ those copyrighted materials for the advancement of
knowledge.").
83. See, e.g., People v. Mathews, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
("[T]he doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal responsibility
where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent
bystander.").
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attacked or to ward off trespass of his property."4 The justification for
self-defense on these occasions is the need to safeguard individual
rights such as the right to life and the right to private property.8 5
The same applies to fair use as an affirmative defense. It enables
a user to safeguard his individual rights by asserting that his personal
interest in using copyrighted materials should be shielded by fair

use.8 6 In a fair use case, a copyright holder (usually the plaintiff) first
establishes a prima facie case for copyright infringement. A user
(typically the defendant) then invokes fair use as an affirmative
defense. To sustain his defense, he needs to demonstrate that his use
of the copyrighted material concerned purposes such as learning,
teaching, research, news reporting, or criticism, and can fall within the
scope of fair use. What undergirds the fair use defense, therefore, is
the need to protect the user's own individual rights, such as the rights
of education and freedom of expression.
2. Burden of Proof on Users
By treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts place the
burden of proving fair use on the allegedly infringing users in
copyright disputes. Fair use cases are seen by courts as involving
conflicts of individual rights enjoyed by copyright holders and users,
respectively. By placing the burden of proof on users, courts address
conflicts of rights on the basis of the procedural as well as substantive
mechanisms for protecting copyright as an individual right.
First of all, many fair use decisions show that, as a matter of
procedure, the user's right as an individual right merits an equal
treatment with the copyright holder's right. Courts have justified the
placing of the burden to prove fair use on users based on the

84. See, e.g., People v. Kane, 29 N.E. 1015, 1016 (N.Y. 1892) ("The ownership and
possession of property confer a certain right to defend that possession, [including] a
defense of it which results in an assault and battery, and that which results in the
destruction of the means used to invade and interfere with that possession.").
85. See, e.g., Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses
From German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 668-69 (2000) ("Self-defense allows one to do
whatever is necessary to defend one's own physical integrity and life against serious
infractions by third parties."); Lauren E. Goldman, Note, NonconfrontationalKillings and
the Appropriate Use of the Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazardsof Subjective
Self-Defense and the Merits of PartialExcuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 198 (1994)
("A killing in self-defense is justified because the benefit gained by affirming the
defendant's rights to life and protection against aggression outweighs the harm caused by
the death of the aggressor, producing a net benefit to society.").
86. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "affirmative
defense" as "[a] defendant's assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the
plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true").
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procedural need to give an equal treatment of both parties' individual
rights in a fair use case. For example, in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 87
the Ninth Circuit explained:
At trial, the defendant in an infringement action bears the
burden of proving fair use.... Because "the burdens at the
preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial," once
the moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood
of success on the merits, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to show a likelihood that its affirmative defense will
succeed.88
The shift of the burden of proof, in this context, indicates that
both the copyright holder's and the user's rights carry equal weight in
terms of their positions in the litigation procedure. When the
copyright holder first fulfills the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of copyright infringement, the burden of proof is shifted to the
user to demonstrate fair use. 89 Regardless of the merits of their
claims, the procedural rule will not lead the user's right to gain
primacy over the copyright holder's right, relieving the user of his
burden of proof. Both parties with individual rights, therefore, need
to bear an equal burden of proof if they intend to capitalize on
procedural rules to protect their own individual interests.
Moreover, courts have laid great importance on the substantive
value of protecting copyright as an individual right. For instance,
courts have come to the conclusion that the exercise of users' rights,
such as the right to freedom of expression, should not necessarily gain
primacy over copyrights. Implied in such a decision is the courts'
inclination to treat fair use cases as involving conflicts between the
two types of individual rights held by the copyright holder and the
user. They are both individual rights and therefore should have equal
weight in terms of the substantive value of individual rights
protection. Following this line of argument, courts have reasoned in
87. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
88. Id. at 1158 (quoting Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)).
89. See, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d
1287, 1307 n.21 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The affirmative defense of fair use is a mixed question
of law and fact as to which the proponent carries the burden of proof."); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Fair use serves as an affirmative
defense to a claim of copyright infringement, and thus the party claiming that its
secondary use of the original copyrighted work constitutes a fair use typically carries the
burden of proof as to all issues in the dispute."); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Miramax
Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that "because fair use is
an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of proof on all of its factors").
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fair use cases that neither type of individual right should necessarily
be given greater weight without adequate evidential support.
The Supreme Court's Eldred v. Ashcroft decision clearly
illustrates this line of reasoning. The majority opinion declined to
examine whether the expansion of copyright protection at issue
would impinge upon users' right to freedom of expression. However,
it made clear how the potential conflict between copyright and users'
rights to freedom of expression should be addressed. The Court
stated that "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the freedom to
make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches."9
Based on the substantive value of rights protection, the above
statement has two implications for the rule regarding the burden of
proof in fair use cases. On the one hand, it implies that the copyright
and the free speech right should both be regarded as individual
rights.91 This makes it impossible for the free speech right to gain
primacy over copyright.' 2 Therefore, it follows that in protecting
users' free speech rights through the fair use doctrine, both the
legislative and judicial branches of government should not
presumptively give primacy to the substantive value of free speech
protection over the substantive value of copyright protection.
On the other hand, the above statement from Eldred also shows
that in fair use cases, copyright can even have temporary trumping
power over the free speech right where the copyright holder
successfully establishes a prima facie case of copyright infringement.
In treating copyrighted works as the embodiment of creators'
speeches, Eldred held that the free speech principle "bears less
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's

90. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication:Dissolving the
Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright,56 U. TORONTO L.J. 75, 75 (2006)
("Freedom of expression protects an individual's right to express herself without
limitations imposed upon the content of her speech, while copyright law prevents an
individual from expressing herself through another's copyrightable expression.").
92. The conflicting judicial opinions regarding shopping mall cases clearly
demonstrate this point. In some cases, courts ruled against private owners of shopping
malls and ordered opening of malls for free speech activities. See, e.g., Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (ruling that the property right of a
privately owned shopping center was not "infringed by the California Supreme Court's
decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression
and petition on appellants' property"). Yet, courts also have ruled to the contrary on the
basis that "property [does not] lose its private character [even though] the public is
generally invited to use it for designated purposes." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
571 (1972).
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speeches." 93 Therefore, the temporary trumping power wielded by
copyright as an individual right requires the user to bear the burden
of proving fair use. Even if the user claims to have a free speech right
to use copyrighted works, courts should still place the burden of
proving fair use on the user.
3. Judicial Failure to Consider the Public Interest
By treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts make only
limited inquiry into the value of the use of copyrighted works for the
public when weighing the four fair use factors. Courts instead mediate
the conflict of rights between a copyright holder and a user based
largely on the evidence submitted by the individual user. The judicial
decision is centered on a judgment of which party's rights should
prevail when the court weighs competing claims raised by both
parties. Therefore, the affirmative defense mode triggers a judicial
process that determines every fair use case as involving the conflict of
rights between an individual copyright holder and an individual user.
Even when a fair use case has a far-reaching impact on other users
who do not participate in the litigation, courts tend to focus solely on
the conduct of the individual user as the accused infringer when
weighing the fair use factors.
For example, in a case in which a photocopy shop was sued for
copying coursepacks for college students at the request of their
professors, the court simply considered whether or not the copyshop's
conduct constituted fair use. I The coursepacks that contained
excerpts from copyrighted works were assembled by professors for
their students as course reading materials. The court did not consider
whether teachers' and students' interests in fair use would be
jeopardized if the copyshop's reproduction of coursepacks was not
fair use.95 Put differently, the court needed to examine the extent to

which the copying service provided by the copyshop had functioned
to protect teachers' and students' fair use interests in copying for
educational or learning purposes. This is because, as the court
93. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
94. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that "the defendants' commercial exploitation of the copyrighted materials
did not constitute fair use").
95. See, e.g., Amy E. Groves, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc.: The Sixth Circuit Frustrates the ConstitutionalPurpose of Copyright and the

Fair Use Doctrine, 31 GA. L. REV. 325, 364 (1996) ("Unfortunately, the implications of the
Sixth Circuit's decision reach beyond the particular facts of this case. Determining
educational fair use by looking at who pushes the button on the copier severely limits the
use of copyrighted materials in academic settings.").
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acknowledged, "[t]he physical production of coursepacks is typically
handled by a commercial copyshop." 96 The teachers' and students'
fair use interests, in this context, were closely intertwined with the
copyshop's service. Despite this, the court focused on the extent to
which the copyright holders' interest was affected by the
unauthorized copying of their materials by the copyshop. 97
Courts following this approach examine only whether the
interest of an individual user involved in the dispute should be
protected by the fair use doctrine. Courts consider the extent to which
that individual's interest has anything to do with the interests of the
relevant members of the public. There are a few cases in which courts
briefly considered the public interest. 98 Yet a recent empirical study
on fair use shows that courts have not yet comprehensively examined
the public interest when weighing the four fair use factors. 99
Moreover, commentators have pointed out that, by treating fair use
as an affirmative defense, courts have placed too much emphasis on

96. Princeton Univ. Press,99 F.3d at 1384.
97. Id. at 1385 ("The four statutory factors may not have been created equal. In
determining whether a use is 'fair,' the Supreme Court has said that the most important
factor is the fourth, the one contained in 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).... We take it that this factor,
'the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,' is at
least primus inter pares, figuratively speaking, and we shall turn to it first." (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006)) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 566 (1985)).
98. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Google
has provided a significant benefit to the public. Weighing this significant transformative
use against the unproven use of Google's thumbnails for cell phone downloads, and
considering the other fair use factors, all in light of the purpose of copyright, we conclude
that Google's use of Perfect 10's thumbnails is a fair use."); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244,
254 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he public exhibition of art is widely and we think properly
considered to 'have value that benefits the broader public interest.' " (quoting Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994))); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring)
(pointing out that if copyright holders had the right to prevent others from making parody
of their works, such right would create "a policy that would extend intellectual property
protection into the precincts of censorship" (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(holding in favor of fair use in part because "[tihere is a public interest in having the fullest
information available on the murder of President Kennedy").
99. See Beebe, supra note 37, at 561-64 (discussing courts' mechanical application of
the four fair use factors); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use 29-30 (Mar. 15, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), availableat http:
//ssrn.com/ abstract=1769130 (examining the core fair use factors); cf. Samuelson, supra
note 3, at 2541-42 (discussing the "policies underlying modern fair use law").
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examining the impact of the use on the copyright holder's market,
which is required by the fourth factor of the fair use analysis."0
The Supreme Court's Harper & Row decision epitomizes this
mode of judicial decision-making. In Harper & Row the Court held
The Nation's unauthorized publication of approximately 300 words of
direct quotation from the unpublished 500-page manuscript of former
President Gerald Ford's memoir did not constitute a fair use.10 1 The
quotations concerned the Watergate scandal, an historical event of
undoubted significance for the public interest. Sc
In rendering the decision, the Court did not examine whether the
quotations would produce any public benefits, such as promoting
democracy through protecting the free flow of information and the
freedom of expression. Instead, the Court denied the need to consider
the defendant's implication that the unauthorized use of the
quotations was for the protection of the public interest. 103 This is
because such a need was outweighed by the fact that the copyright
holder had a potential market in licensing others to use the work, and
magazine publishers could afford to pay for its use. Had fair use been
allowed on the basis of protecting the public interest, the market
value of the copyrighted work would very likely be harmed." °4
Moreover, the Court neglected the fact that "scooping" as a news
reporting method, which prompted the early disclosure of the
information about the Watergate scandal, strongly incentivizes the
publication and circulation of news by media. As Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "[a] news business earns its
reputation, and therefore its readership, through consistent prompt
publication of news-and often through 'scooping' rivals."'0 5 In sum,
the Court did not consider the extent to which the release of firsthand information would promote the public debate about this

100. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 57981 (2008) (explaining the harmful effects of judicial overemphasis on market impact and
proposing a two-factor fair use analysis); Lunney, supra note 3, at 999, 1023 (arguing that
the current four-factor test is not balanced for users).
101. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542, 569 (1985).
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id. at 569 ("The Nation's use of the copyrighted material was [not] excused by the
public's interest in the subject matter.").
104. Id. at 559 (" '[To] propose that fair use be imposed whenever the social value [of
dissemination] ...outweighs any detriment to the artist, would be to propose depriving
copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they encounter those users
who could afford to pay for it.' " (quoting Gordon, supra note 81, at 1615) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
105. Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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historical event or public interest in prompt publication and
circulation of the news.
C. Problems with Fair Use as an Individual Right

The preceding Section revealed how and why the individual
right-based approach has been adopted by courts to define fair use as
an affirmative defense. This Section will show that the individual
right-based approach, in fact, has caused direct and indirect harms to
public interests in free speech, democratic participation, and cultural
development.
1. Harming the Public Interest in Judicial Proceedings
a.

DirectHarms

As shown in the preceding Section, courts treat fair use cases as
involving conflicts between the copyright holder's and the user's
individual rights. To resolve these conflicts of rights, courts routinely
focus on whether a user's personal interest can gain primacy, through
a showing of fair use, over the copyright holder's personal interest in
the exclusive control of the copyrighted work concerned. Meanwhile,
they do not adequately consider the extent to which the public
interest should be protected in fair use cases. This judicial practice,
however, has gone too far in protecting the interest of the copyright
holder.
Again, take the Supreme Court's Harper & Row decision as an
example. By hailing the "market value" factor as "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use," 106 Harper & Row
foreclosed fair use by primarily weighing the individual interest in
accessing and using works against the copyright holder's economic
interest. Through this emphasis on the protection of the copyright
holder's economic interest, the Court applied "an exceedingly narrow
definition of the scope of fair use." 1" Therefore, the Harper & Row
decision ignored the fact that the defendant's quoting 300 to 400
words of the former president's manuscript was vital to lending
authenticity to its news reporting of the historical event of the
resignation and pardon of former president Richard Nixon. Keeping
the public informed of the details of that historical event undoubtedly
"furthered the public interest"1 8 in "[a] broad dissemination of
106. Id. at 566 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 591.
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principles, ideas, and factual information [that] is crucial to the robust
public debate and informed citizenry." 1"
Harper & Row is based upon the notion that fair use is an
individual right. 110 The central problem caused by this notion

concerns the likelihood that courts will prioritize the protection of
copyright rather than the public's right to fair use. This likelihood

may translate into judicial decisions that inadequately consider the
extent to which the public interest should be protected.'

Justice

Brennan argued that "[t]he progress of arts and sciences and the
robust public debate essential to an enlightened citizenry are ill
served by this constricted reading of the fair use doctrine. "112

Copyright as a form of property rights carries the right to exclude
non-owners from using copyrighted works.'13 It is the right to exclude

that empowers copyright holders to receive economic benefits by
charging license fees. The opinions rendered by Harper & Row and

its progeny,1 " however, overly protected the right to exclude without
109. Id. at 582.
110. See Sun, supra note 21, at 321 (pointing out that the Harper & Row-type judicial
practice of treating fair use as an affirmative defense "would give rise to the problem that
[the public's] rights are automatically 'ranked' lower than copyrights" and that "courts
actually water down the importance of protecting public interest").
111. Id.
112. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring) ("The notion of property ...
consists in the right to exclude others from interference with the more or less free doing
with it as one wills."); Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging Intellectual Property: Beyond the
'Right to Exclude', WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents
/leveragingip.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (arguing that the core of real property and
intellectual property is the right to exclude).
114. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998)
("In considering the fourth [fair use] factor, our concern is not whether the secondary use
suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives,
but whether the secondary use usurps or substitutes for the market of the original work.");
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is not
unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become
legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a
use is made easier.... An unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a
ready market or means to pay for the use."); see also NETANEL, supra note 7, at 64-65
("Courts have repeatedly invoked the bare possibility of licensing in potential markets for
the copyright holder's work to deny fair use and have insisted that while evidence of
market harm generally dooms a fair use claim, the absence of such evidence in no way
guarantees that the use will be deemed fair."); Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving
Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 618 (2001)
("Courts have increasingly favored copyright holders' rights, relying on economic models
and potential licensing opportunities.").
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due regard to its impact on the public interest. In this way, they share
' with Lucas v. South Carolina
the same "property-centered view" 115
Coastal Council, 116 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
regulatory taking of a landowner's property on the ground that it
"denie[d] all economically beneficial or productive use" of the
property.117 Yet such a justification was based purely on the "market
value" factor or the economic injury to the property owner. The
Court did not scrutinize the fact that the regulatory taking in question
served a strong public interest in preserving the natural ecosystem of
the beachfront areas.118 Private property protection was prioritized by
Lucas at the expense of the public interest in environmental
protection. The same is true for Harper & Row and its progeny.119
Those cases prioritized private property protection for copyright
holders at the expense of the public interest in the free flow of
information and knowledge. As Professor Lemley bluntly pointed
out, "[c]opying is less likely to be excused as a fair use of the
copyright than ever before, particularly if the licensor can show that
some money could have been squeezed out of the user."12'

115. NETANEL, supra note 7, at 64-65 ("Since Harper & Row, the Blackstonian
property-centered view of fair use has steadily gained ground.").
116. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
117. Id. at 1015. In this case, David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle
of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina. Id. at 1006-07. However, South Carolina
enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any
permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. Id. at 1006. Thus, the central question
the Court dealt with in Lucas was whether ecologically-based shoreline regulations that
prohibit further development constitute a taking of the landowner's property. Id. at 1009.
118. In its "takings" jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has parted with the so-called
categorical rule that regulatory takings are always considered takings. See generally
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(holding that whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking "depends upon the
particular circumstances of the case" and rejecting the categorical rule asserted by
petitioner); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that a taking did not
occur by the designation of the petitioner's property as protected wetlands because the
land retained significant developmental value). For a detailed discussion about the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence, see generally Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem:
The Death of the Scalian View of Propertyand Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727 (2004).
119. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1043 (2005) ("Courts applying the property theory of intellectual property are
seeking out and eliminating uses of a right they perceive to be free riding.").
120. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 900 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)).
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b. IndirectHarms
Treating fair use as merely an affirmative defense has also caused
indirect harms to users. Placing the burden of proof on users causes
them to bear extra litigation costs. Fair use analysis is a mixed
question of law and fact."' All claims of fair use must be judged on
the totality of the facts together with the fair use factors. To prove the
existence of fair use, a user is required to "produce the necessary
evidence (even where the inquiry is speculative) and to persuade the
court that her interpretation of the evidence reflects fact (even where
the inquiry is subjective)."' 22 Therefore, the user has to hire attorneys
to fulfill the onerous procedural and evidentiary requirements
required by the affirmative defense mode. The whole process of
can easily reach six figures in attorney's
proving fair use, therefore,
1 23
fees on the user's side.
Additionally, the possibility of being assessed statutory damages
and attorney's fees may further exacerbate the financial burden that
the user will bear if he fails to prove the existence of fair use.
Statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 per work infringed and
can be increased to $150,000 per work infringed if a willful copyright
infringement is found. 124 This means that even if a user asserted fair
use, being adjudged to have infringed the work may still lead him 12to5
be assessed thousands of dollars of penalties per work infringed.
Worse still, the user may also be required to pay the copyright
holder's attorney's fees because the successful party in a copyright
the amount of reasonable attorney's fees as
dispute can be awarded
126
costs.
his
of
part

121. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("Fair
use is a mixed question of law and fact.").
122. Snow, supra note 68, at 1814.
123. See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer He Can't Refuse: A Proposed
Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 287, 311 (2004) ("Intellectual property litigation typically spans several years with
total costs commonly exceeding hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. A 2001
survey ...calculated the average cost through trial of typical patent disputes ...at
$1,499,000; $699,000 for similar trade secret disputes; $502,000 for trademark disputes; and
$400,000 for copyright disputes." (footnotes omitted)).
124. 17 U.S.C.A §§ 504(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2011).
125. See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, 2000 WL 1863566, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2000) (holding the defendant liable for a statutory damages award of one million
dollars); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2009) ("Even a defendant
who presents a plausible fair use defense at trial may find itself subject to large statutory
damage awards.").
126. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
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Thus, the combination of all these costs simply reduces users'
right to fair use' 27 to "the right to hire a lawyer to defend [one's] right
to create." 2 8 To make the matter worse, potential fair users are
vulnerable to the indirect harm caused by their adoption of selfcensorship practices. This self-censorship practice leads users to give
up their fair use right. As shown above, treating fair use as an
affirmative defense has raised the costs significantly for the public to
exercise its fair use right. Consequently, users may face the problem
that the increased cost incurred by their assertion of the fair use
defense would far exceed the benefit they can derive from fair use.
Being aware of this cost-benefit analysis, any risk-averse users would
have to opt out of the fair use option. Therefore, users may avoid
using copyrighted works or may agree to overly restrictive terms
imposed by copyright holders.'2 9 Surprisingly, the Copyright Office
has even encouraged risk-averse users to automatically give up their
fair use right and obtain authorization from copyright holders on
these occasions. 13 0 Hence, treating fair use merely as an affirmative
defense may raise questions as to whether a user's fair use right can
still be adequately protected. This is simply because defending fair
use as an individual right "costs too much, it delivers too slowly, and
what it delivers often has little connection to the justice underlying
the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich. For
everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
' 31
on the rule of law.'

127. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 165 ("Part of the problem [that has caused harm
to the public interest] is procedural-fair use is a defense that the accused infringer must
prove.").
128. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY 187 (2004).

129. See, e.g., JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect
DigitalFree Speech, 13 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 98 (2004) ("As an affirmative defense,
whether a use is 'fair' can be determined only within the context of infringement litigation,
and the defendant bears the burden of proof. Thus... users with limited resources may be
silenced by the mere threat of litigation long before a fair use analysis is brought to bear
on any First Amendment interests." (footnote omitted)); Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an
Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV.
133, 180 (2007) (arguing that high litigation costs deter users from asserting their
legitimate fair use claims).
130. Fair Use, U. S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Nov. 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fllO2
.html (noting "[tlhe safest course is always to get permission from the copyright owner
before using copyrighted material").
131. LESSIG, supra note 128, at 187; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 697, 721 (2003) (arguing that many would-be fair users may be
considerably deterred by the risk of failing to satisfy the fair-use burden of proof).
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2. How Copyright Holders Harm the Public Interest

Generally
market right
dissemination
dedication to

speaking, copyright law confers upon creators the
to exclusive benefits from the production and
of their works. At the heart of copyright law lies its
protecting economic rights as the most direct and

important means of ensuring monetary returns to creators. 132 Yet this

mode of protection, if not checked by strong limitations on economic
rights, may result in the exploitation of those who seek to use the
works controlled by copyright holders and especially copyright-based
conglomerates. Treating fair use as an individual right, however, by
no means imposes limitations on copyright strong enough to deter
copyright-based conglomerates from committing manipulative actions
against users. Rather, it makes it hard for individual fair users to
combat manipulative actions.
Many copyright holders have adopted an aggressive litigation
strategy in order to deter the public from actively asserting its fair use
right. By taking advantage of the user's burden to prove fair use,

many copyright holders have frequently made claims of infringement
even in circumstances where the fair use defense would likely
succeed. They did so in hopes that the user would refrain from the use

rather than spend resources in his defense. 133 Under many,
circumstances, users are, however, not sure whether their uses of
132. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause ... is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors."); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), quoted in Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) ("[C]opyright law celebrates the profit motive,
recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to
the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.... The profit motive is
the engine that ensures the progress of science.").
133. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1052 (2006) ("When
de minimis copying and fair use are routinely discouraged, a copyright notice comes to
signal not merely that the work is protected, but that every reproduction is prohibited.");
Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 233-34 (2007) (arguing that cease and desist notices discourage
fair uses of works); Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive
Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. REV. 673, 677 (2003) ("[A]ggressive copyright claims are
often made against defendants who have done more than simply 'parrot' a copyrighted
work. These defendants have generally added meaningful work of their own, whether in
the form of comment and criticism, significant reworking of the plaintiff's material, or new
material unrelated to the copyrighted work. At their most extreme, aggressive copyright
claims assert that almost any borrowing from a copyrighted work constitutes actionable
infringement.").
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works can be deemed fair because the fair use doctrine is too vague
and indeterminate for them to rely on to predict what a court or jury
would decide."' Users become afraid of being sued because of the

significant time, energy, and financial cost of litigation. Faced with
this kind of hidden coercion that may be exerted by the copyright
holder, many individuals or entities may simply refrain from making
fair uses of copyrighted works.'3 5 Many educational institutions in
particular have already adopted overly restrictive fair use policies.136
The public at large is also faced with the visible coercion that the
copyright holder may exert against them. First, many copyright
holders have routinely exaggerated the scope of their economic rights
as a way to prevent the public from making a fair use of their works.
For example, the cautionary notice-"No part of this book can be
reproduced without the permission of the publisher"-appears in
almost every book published, copyrighted or not. Publishers also
routinely limit users by stating they may quote no more than a
specified limited number of words, lines, or paragraphs from the

134. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 42, at 887-95 (explaining that the indeterminancy of
the fair use doctrine coupled with the high penalties associated with copyright
infringement decrease user reliance on fair use); Liu, supra note 41, at 451 ("[P]rotecting
free speech interests requires us not to be content with the mere existence of [free speech]
safeguards, but to think seriously about mechanisms for reducing the chilling effect of
uncertainty .... ").
135. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07
(1990) (describing the uncertainty surrounding fair use and the resulting reluctance to
employ it); Liu, supra note 41, at 434 ("The chilling effect on creative [fair-use] expression
has been well documented. This is exacerbated by the tendency of copyright owners to
take advantage of the uncertainty to pursue aggressive copyright claims."); Parchomovsky
& Goldman, supra note 41, at 1497-98 (pointing out that the vagueness of the fair use
doctrine overdeters fair uses); Tushnet, supra note 10, at 545 ("Even a successful fair use
defense is expensive, and the risk of such a lawsuit deters publishers from investing in
potentially infringing works ... ").
136. WILLIAM W. FISHER & WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, THE DIGITAL LEARNING
CHALLENGE: OBSTACLES TO EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 85-87 (2006), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law

.harvard.edu/files/BerkmanWhitePaper_08-10-2006.pdf
(explaining the presence of
"[u]nduly [c]autious [g]atekeepers" of fair use in universities); Fisher, supra note 3, at 1694
("[A]s almost any college teacher can attest, the information presently being given faculty
by university counsel regarding how much copyrighted material they may reproduce for
classroom use is distinctly unhelpful."); Gibson, supra note 42, at 892 & n.27 (citing
examples of "overly restrictive and reductive fair use policies" in institutions of higher
education) Robert A. Gorman, Lecture, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus, 47
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 297, 313 n.36 (2000) (describing New York University's
settlement arrangement with several publishers regarding copyright infringement, and the
University's subsequent implementation of severely restrictive fair use guidelines).
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book. 137 It seems that all publishers accustomed to using
exaggerations of this kind have turned a blind eye to the fair use
doctrine, which sets no fixed limit on the amount users can copy and
in fact allows the public to reproduce portions, or even the entire
content, of the work.138 These all exemplify what commentators call
'
"aggressive copyright claims."139
Moreover, copyright holders may
leverage their economic rights to impose prohibitively high license
fees on users. Practices of this kind are still legal because holders
charge fees in accordance with their business practices.
The following case epitomizes manipulative actions committed
by some big media corporations and the inability of the individual
right-based fair use policy to empower users to combat them. Jon
Else, a documentary filmmaker, spent almost nine years raising funds
and producing a noncommercial documentary. Fox News insisted on
charging a license fee of $10,000 for him to use "a 4.5-second, out-offocus, no-sound background shot" in that documentary. Else was
advised by his attorney that his use of that shot might be fair use, but
he might be embroiled in litigation if Fox News decided to sue him.
Because the license fee was prohibitively high for him, he had to cut
that shot from his documentary. 140 Jon Else's story is not an isolated
case. Many other documentary filmmakers, researchers, and students
in educational institutions are faced with similar situations.4

137.

STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: How To PROTECT & USE

WRITrEN WORKS 11/10 (8th ed. 2005) ("[Allthough there is no legally established word

limit for fair use, many publishers act as if there were one and require their authors to
obtain permission to quote more [than] a specified number of words (ranging from 100 to
1,000 words).").
138. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding that
extensive copying for the purpose of parody is fair use); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (holding that verbatim copying for timeshifting purpose is fair use).
139. Yen, supra note 133, at 677 ("The practice of ignoring the First Amendment in
copyright cases has ... made possible the problematic assertion of what I call 'aggressive
copyright claims.' As the label implies, these claims aggressively test the boundaries of
copyright by urging courts to adopt unconventional or novel readings of doctrine that
would extend copyright well beyond its core of preventing individuals from reproducing
the copyrighted works of others."); see also William W. Fisher III, The Implicationsfor
Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1440 (2010) (arguing that some copyright
holders "seem uninterested in license fees" and "seek to prevent modifications" of their
works); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 406 (2009)
(contending that copyright holders make overly-broad claims to their works and often fail
to accommodate any possible fair uses).
140. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 15-17.
141. See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA,
UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE
FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 7-10 (2005), available at http://www.acsil.org
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3. Harming the Public Interest in the Legislative Process
Copyright legislation is intended to promote and protect the
public welfare. 42 However, the individual right-based approach to
fair use gives legislators the leeway to alter the public welfareoriented nature of copyright legislation into a copyright holder-

centric lawmaking process. Heavily promoted by copyright-based
conglomerates, the recent broad expansion of copyright protection

largely catered to corporate interests in strengthening proprietary
control over knowledge and information at the expense of the public
interest. 143 Indeed, the public at large has failed to have its concerns

voiced in the copyright legislative process or to have them seriously
scrutinized by legislators.1" One of the primary reasons is that too
many legislators are focused on protecting copyright holders'
individual interests. They pay little attention to the need for
defending the public's collective interests in knowledge and
information contained in copyrighted works. 145
The copyright holder-centered lawmaking process has caused a
massive private enclosure of digital information. 146 The Digital
/resources/rights-clearances-1/nps240.tmp.pdf; FISHER & MCGEVERAN, supra note 136, at
77-85; Lawrence Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at
A29 (giving examples of speech-suppressing copyright claims asserted as to political ads in
recent campaigns).
142. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) ("The enactment of copyright legislation
by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that
the author has in his writings.., but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.").
143. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 22-76 (describing the problems with the recent
expansion of copyright laws, including how copyright law tends to cater to larger corporate
interests); NETANEL, supra note 7, at 184 (arguing that the legislative expansions of
copyright "often consist of outright congressional rubber-stamping of industry-drafted
legislative and committee reports").
144. NETANEL, supra note 7, at 184 ("In contrast to well-heeled interest groups, the
public consists of a large number of discrete individuals, each with a small, highly diffuse
stake in the regulation at issue. As a result, the general public faces serious organizational
obstacles to countering industry lobbying, and when industries lobby for speech
entitlements, the underrepresented public interest in free speech is likely to be
shortchanged.").
145. See Aaron K. Perzanowski, In Defense of Intellectual Property Anxiety: A
Response to ProfessorFagundes,94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 85, 88 (2010), http://
review.law.umn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/PerzanowskiMLR.pdf. ("Congress faces
strong incentives, in the form of well-funded and well-organized lobbies, to remain
persuaded by the private property rhetoric of rights holders.").
146. See generally DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR
COMMON WEALTH (2002) (pointing out the need in the United States for a return to a
stronger balance between public and private ownership of ideas and knowledge and
making suggestions for how this can be done politically); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN
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Millenium Copyright Act ("DCMA"), adopted by Congress in 1998,
is proof of this privatization movement.147 The DMCA prohibits
circumvention of technological measures that are employed by
copyright holders to lock up works in digital form."4 It further bars
manufacture and distribution of devices149 that are capable of
circumventing these technological measures.

By combining these two measures, the DMCA has disrupted the
traditional balance between copyright holders and users that had

been mediated largely by the fair use doctrine. The DMCA accords
paracopyright 5 ° to right holders, allowing them to legally lock up any

information with technological measures. In this way, it entitles
copyright holders to control access to their works,' making it harder
or even impossible for the public to make fair use of works under
many circumstances. The DMCA does create a few exceptions to

anti-circumvention regulations, such as reverse engineering, security
testing, good faith encryption research, and certain uses by nonprofit
libraries, archives, and educational institutions. 15 2 The rulemaking
proceeding shepherded by the Librarian of Congress created only a
few additional exemptions to the ban on circumventing access

BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?

(2002) (discussing the development of international copyright and patent law and the
danger it poses to competition in the market and to liberty); CHRISTOPHER MAY, A
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW
ENCLOSURES? (2000) (discussing the political construction of intellectual property and

whether the current global legal arrangements governing intellectual property are just or
sustainable); Benkler, supra note 7 (explaining how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
the proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act are at the center of a movement toward privatizing
information); Boyle, supra note 7 (discussing the "Second Enclosure Movement" and how
it is privatizing ever increasing amounts of intellectual property).
147. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
149. § 1201(2)(a).
150. Paracopyright means that legal protection of technological measures and
contractual restrictions used by copyright holders would give them proprietary control
over their works far beyond the scope of traditional copyright. For example, the DMCA
allows copyright holders to control access to their works protected by effective
technological measures. However, traditional copyright does not give copyright holders
such a control. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 66-70; Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention
Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096-1110 (2003).
151. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 176 ("At no time, however, until the enactment of the
access-control anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, did Congress or the courts
cede to copyright owners' control over looking at, listening to, learning from, or using
copyrighted works.").
152. §§ 1201(d), (f), (g), (j).
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controls.15 3 But these exceptions in fact all but eliminate traditional
fair use under the DMCA by excluding the open-ended and flexible
nature of fair use.154 Section 107 of the Copyright Act does not
provide an exhaustive list of what constitutes fair use. Instead, it
captures the open-ended and flexible nature of fair use by providing a
few fair use examples and requiring all cases to be examined using the
four fair use factors.
In the conventional copyright system, the public can enjoy fair
use only when is has free and unimpeded access to works in the first
place. Fair use presupposes that the public first has free access to
works and then makes decisions regarding whether it needs to make
fair uses.155 Now, however, free access to works is no longer available
for users because technological measures deployed by copyright
holders simply fence them off from access to works and the DMCA
'
provides penalties against circumvention of these "digital fences." 156
The DMCA's exclusion of fair use is reinforced by judicial
decisions that interpreted the DMCA as a statute that
"fundamentally altered the landscape" of copyright.'57 For example,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes 58 held that there is no
general fair use defense under the DMCA: "If Congress had meant
153. See Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of
Technological Measures that ControlAccess to Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/anticirc.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
154. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You There: User-Generated Content and
Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 908-09 (2010) (arguing the
rulemaking proceedings produced "only extremely narrow exemptions" and "[r]epeated
requests for general 'fair use' exemptions have been rejected").
155. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the "DigitalMillennium", 23 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 140 (1999) (observing that "it may be fair use to make nonprofit
research photocopies of pages from a lawfully acquired book; it is not fair use to steal the
book in order to make the photocopies"); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright Thugs, INDUS.
STANDARD, May 04, 2001, http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,24208,00.html
("Under copyright law, a user has the right of fair use. Under the DMCA, the user has a
right to fair use only if the code of the copyright protection scheme permits it. If the code
does not permit fair use, then the user commits a crime if he makes and distributes tools
that would enable others to crack the copyright protection system, even for purposes of
fair use. The law thus gives industry coders more control over copyrighted material than
the Constitution gives Congress.").
156. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 684-92 (2000) (analyzing various circumvention violations
articulated under the DMCA); Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 9, at 93-94 (pointing
out that there is a lack of fair use protection under the DMCA and that the DMCA
prohibits circumvention of technological controls designed to limit access to copyright
holders' works).
157. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
158. Id.
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the fair use defense to apply to [anti-circumvention] actions, it would
have said so.... [T]he decision not to make fair use a defense to a
'
claim under [the DMCA] was quite deliberate."159
The individual right-based conception of fair use foreshadowed
the demise of fair use under the DMCA. When weighing the
competing demands between the copyright-based industries and users
at large, Congress opted to stand with the former. Commentators
documented the legislative history of the DMCA as follows:
A coalition of organizations, including libraries, educational
institutions, and other nonprofit organizations, raised concerns
about the direct impact such a ban would have on fair and other
non-infringing uses of copyrighted works in digital form, on
access to public domain materials, and on user privacy interests.
These concerns did not, however, arouse Congressional interest
as much as concerns about overbroad [Internet Service
Provider ("ISP")] liability. This relative indifference may be
explained in part perhaps because the lobbying clout of these
nonprofits was minute in comparison with the heft of the
copyright, telecom, and technology industries that lobbied
about ISP liability. 160
Therefore, the DMCA's legislative history shows the individual rightbased conception of fair use did not arouse much interest among
legislators-examining the need to accommodate a viable fair use
system under the DMCA for the public at large. Legislators also did
not consider whether the absence of a general fair use right for those

159. Id. at 322. For the same conclusion, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381
F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (regarding section 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA as a fair use
savings clause). The Copyright Office has suggested that the fair use defense to traditional
copyright infringement does not apply to violations of section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 4 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation
/dmca.pdf ("Since the fair use doctrine is not a defense to the act of gaining unauthorized
access to a work, the act of circumventing a technological measure in order to gain access
is prohibited.").
160. Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse
Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1004 (2007); see also Parchomovsky &
Weiser, supra note 9, at 104 ("In enacting the DMCA, Congress moved quickly to address
the concerns of the content industry and did not focus on the potential for cases like
Corley to restrict the scope of the fair use doctrine in the digital age. Fearful that broad
exceptions might allow increased circumvention to occur, Congress provided only limited
exceptions to the DMCA. Thus, to those in the content industry, the fair use claim
advanced in Corley underscored the need for the DMCA in the first place.").
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who intend to circumvent technological measures would cause
extensive harm to the public interest.16
III. FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE RIGHT
The preceding Part discussed how and why treating fair use as an
affirmative defense has shaped fair use as an individual right.
Moreover, it also revealed the core problem stemming from treating
fair use as an individual right by showing that it has caused serious
harms to the protection of public interests.
To overcome the problems caused by the individual right-based
mode of fair use, this Part puts forward a new theory that
reconceptualizes fair use as a collective user right. It also explains why
users of copyrighted works should be conferred with a collective right
to fair use.
A.

The Collective Right to Participatein Intangible Public Space

1. The Idea of Collective Rights
As discussed in Part II, individual rights are held by individuals
for the purpose of promoting their personal freedom and dignity. 162 In
contrast, collective rights are held by human beings who share
common identities as members of certain societies, communities, or
groups. 163

By bestowing upon individuals an identity-based entitlement,
collective rights protect human interests in membership in society as a
whole, or a relevant community or group. A shared identity of
membership held by individuals entails each member's relationship
with participatory goods. Participatory goods are collective interests
whose enjoyment by an individual depends upon their also being
enjoyed by others.14 For example, a well-functioning society has
participatory goods because each individual's enjoyment of his
161. See Litman, Politics,supra note 14, at 314-15 ("One might naively expect that our
elected senators and representatives are giving proposed legislation a careful look to make
sure it advances the public interest, but they don't seem to see that as their role; rather,
they seem to think that their job is to ensure that the important stakeholders have had an
opportunity to sit down at the table and work things out with each other.").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
163. See, e.g., SEUMAS MILLER, SOCIAL ACTION: A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 211
(2001) (defining collective rights as "joint rights to collective goods possessed in part in
virtue of membership of a social group").
164. See James Morauta, Rights and ParticipatoryGoods, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
91, 94 (2002) ("[A] good G is a participatory good if and only if G is constituted by an
activity which requires the participation of more than one individual.").
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environment depends upon how other individuals participate in
various aspects of social life. It is the efforts made by individuals that
first form a well-functioning society and then sustain and improve the
enjoyment of that well-functioning society by each individual who
lives in it. Nobody can create a well-functioning society and enjoy it
entirely by himself. From this perspective, participatory goods are
both produced and enjoyed collectively by those who participate in
them. Therefore, the participatory nature of membership in society or
a relevant community or group bestows upon each individual member
collective rights. 165 Collective rights allow members to participate in
the creation and enjoyment of goods that are integral to society, or a
relevant community or group. Individual rights are different from
collective rights. Individual right-holders do not share the collective
identity to create and enjoy interests in participatory goods. Rather,
they each create and enjoy their own interests. For example, a private
property subject to protection as an individual right is created and
enjoyed by an individual for his own interest.
While individual rights promote personal development and
growth of individuals, collective rights promote human beings as
social members and enhance their interests in communal
development. As Joseph Raz has pointed out, collective rights protect
"interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and
the [collective] right is a right to that public good because it serves
their interest as members of the group." 166 Take a well-functioning
society again as an example. Individuals collectively create a good
society. They create a good social environment for themselves to live
in. For example, the reduction of air pollution would create a better
environment for each individual to enjoy the bounty of nature
afforded by forests, rivers, lakes, and the like. The improvement of
public safety would benefit each individual when he walks in public
streets late at night. From this perspective, the realization of the
collective right to a good society entitles each individual member of a
group to claim the collective interest in participating in activities that
take place in public spaces of the group to which he belongs.
Meanwhile, the enjoyment of collective rights may produce positive
165. See GEORGE W. RAINBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 206 (2006) ("Many group
rights seem to be rights to participatory goods."); Denise Rdaume, Individuals, Groups,
and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1 (1988) (arguing that "any rights to
participatory goods must be held by groups rather than individuals").
166. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 208 (1986); see also Leslie Green,
Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 315, 320-21 (1991) (explaining
why collective rights should be viewed as rights to collective interests).
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effects on the ways in which individual rights can be enjoyed by
individual right holders. 67 For example, the reduction of air pollution
and improvement of public safety facilitate the protection and
enjoyment of an individual's health, life, or private property. Thus,
collective rights promote the protection and enjoyment of individual
rights.
At the international level, collective rights have been used to
protect a variety of resources that are of critical importance for
furthering social membership and communal development. Cultural
heritage is a typical example. Cultural heritage promotes the shared
identities of the inhabitants of a particular village, region, or country,
or of the members of a social, cultural, or religious group, and
facilitates communication of shared beliefs, customs, language, status
within a society, and historical experiences. 16 This idea of an
intangible cultural heritage further reinforces collective rights in our
shared interests in improving communal development. For example,
the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage states:
"[I]ntangible cultural heritage" means the practices,
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills-as well as the
instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated
therewith-that communities, groups and, in some cases,
individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This
intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to
generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups
in response to their environment, their interaction with nature
and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity
promoting respect for cultural diversity and
and continuity, thus
169
creativity.
human
At the national level, collective rights have also played a pivotal
role in promoting social membership and communal development. In
the United States, the public trust doctrine embodies a dynamic
vision of protecting the public's collective rights to public spaces that
are central to human development. Rooted in Roman law concepts of
167. See Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS.
127, 141 (2004) ("The collective interests of a particular collectivity ... are not unrelated
to members' individual interests, for the collectivity's moral existence depends on its
ability to provide a collective interest that improves the lives of its individual members.").
168. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of
Property,118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009) (arguing that cultural heritage is "integral to the
group identity and cultural survival of indigenous peoples").
169. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. II, Oct.
17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 35.
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public property, the public trust doctrine, in its original form,
prescribed that the air, rivers, sea, and seashore should be treated as
public properties, open for the public to use. For instance, the
Institutes of Justinianstates:
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the
air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the sea-shore,
provided that he respects habitations, monuments, and
buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of
nations. 170

The scope of the public trust doctrine has been vastly expanded
in the American legal system. It has become a mechanism for
protecting the public's collective interests in maintaining and
enhancing the vitality of public spaces.' In Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court drew on the collective right approach

to establish a new way to protect the public interest in submerged
lands:
[The title to submerged lands] is a title different in character
from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is
different from the title which the United States hold in the
public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title
held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.'
Accordingly, the public trust doctrine performs the collective
rights-conferring function (to "the people of the State") primarily by
holding certain resources in trust for the general public as a whole
and thereby making them open for all. These resources are by nature
regarded as "inherent public property" 174 and every member of the
public has free and unimpeded access to them. Placing ownership in
the general public makes the boundaries of the public trust resources
constantly open to everyone on equal terms. Since Illinois Centralwas
decided in 1892, the public trust doctrine has conferred four kinds of
170. J. INST. 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1853).
171. See Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 563, 581 (2011) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is "a solid
legal mandate for protecting public space and promoting public freedom").
172. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
173. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
174. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711,720 (1986).
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collective rights upon individuals as members of the public: the right
to participate in economic activities in public space, the right to
ecological protection of public space, the right to cultural
public space, and the right to political participation in
participation in
75
public space.1
2. Defining the Collective Right to Participate in Intangible Public
Space
Certain resources such as public streets, roads, parks, and
squares are crucial elements of dynamic and robust public spaces.
Since these resources exist in tangible form, they constitute the
tangible public space where people engage physically in interactions
with other human beings. Tangible public space has two core
attributes: publicity and commonality. First, public space is the open
arena where "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard
by everybody and has the widest possible publicity." 176 Once
individuals enter into public spaces, it is inevitable that they expose
themselves to others though the means and degree of self-exposure
vary depending on circumstances.
Second, tangible public space is the open arena where people
share common resources that are not held in exclusive possession by
any single person. 177 A public park, for example, is a place where all
people, regardless of their income or residency, can enter and enjoy
because the public park is a common resource, and everyone is
entitled to have access to and make use of it.
While public space can be comprised of tangible resources, it can
also be formed by resources that exist in intangible form. These
resources are primarily knowledge and information. They constitute
the resource that forms what I call intangible public space. 178 In
175. See Sun, supra note 171, at 588-93.
176. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 50 (2d ed. 1998). A similar notion
of publicity is offered by Iris Young. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND

DEMOCRACY 168-70 (2000) (describing the public forum as "in principle accessible to
anyone").
177. ARENDT, supra note 176, at 52.
178. Henri Lefebvre advocates that there are three types of public space: physical
space, social space, and mental space (also called symbolic space). HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE

PRODUCTION OF SPACE 11-12 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., Blackwell Publishers
1991) (1974). Physical public space is described as the physical environment and evokes
images such as streets, plazas, picnic areas, and beaches. See id. Abstract space, according
to Lefebvre, is the space of instrumental rationality, fragmentation, homogenization, and,
most importantly, commodification. See id. at 49-59. In contrast, social space is the space
of everyday lived experience, an environment that is a place to live and to call home. See
id. at 16.
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intangible public space, people use knowledge and information as
public resources to communicate with one another. According to
Michel Foucault, "knowledge is also the space in which the subject
may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in
his discourse ... ."179 Based upon the knowledge and information
they obtain, people talk and write not only about their personal
matters but also the larger economic, cultural, and political issues in
society at large. In addition to talking and writing, people also use
knowledge and information in other forms of communicative
actions, 180 such as painting and dancing.
Moreover, people perform communicative actions in intangible
public space based upon public use of their reason.181 To make public
use of reason, one first selects knowledge and information available
in intangible public space and then uses it to communicate with others
about one's own inner world of reasoning. Thus, our public use of
reason entails a combination of two interconnected processes. On the
one hand, people need to internalize knowledge and information to
trigger their thinking and reasoning abilities. 1" Once people enter
into public space, they are observing and interacting with others in
public space as well. The process of observation and interaction
179. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 201 (A. M. Sheridan
Smith trans., Routledge Classics 2002) (1969).
180. For Habermas, communicative action plays an essential role in shaping human
beings and human society in the following three ways: "Under the functional aspect of
mutual understanding, communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural
knowledge; under the aspect of coordinating action, it serves social integration and the
establishment of solidarity; finally, under the aspect of socialization, communicative action
serves the formation of personal identities." 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 137 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981).
181. For the idea of the public use of reason, see IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO
THE QUESTION: 'WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?' (1784), reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 54, 55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991) ("The public use of
man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men
.); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
see also
PUBLIC SPHERE 27 (Thomas Burger trans., First MIT Press paperback ed., Mass. Inst. of
Tech. 1991) (1962) (arguing that "people's public use of their reason" was central to the
formation of the public sphere in 18th century Europe).
182. This process of internalizing knowledge and information can be found in
Habermas's following discussion about the nature of the public sphere:
However exclusive the public might be in any given instance, it could never close
itself off entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for it always understood
and found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people,
persons who-insofar they were propertied and educated-as readers, listeners,
and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were
subject to discussion.
HABERMAS,

supra note 181, at 37 (emphasis added).
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to
generates the necessary knowledge and information for individuals
83
think and reason about matters in intangible public space.
On the other hand, individuals also need to externalize
knowledge and information resulting from their thinking and
reasoning abilities in order to sustain and enhance their activities of
184
observing and interacting with others in intangible public space.
When people speak, write, or act, they impart to others knowledge
and information such that others perceive what they are thinking. The
performers of these actions use knowledge and information to dictate
and organize the movements of their bodies to reveal their inner
feelings to the audiences in the outer world. The process of writing
for the purpose of publication, for example, clearly entails the
combination of these two processes. Authors write based upon
knowledge and information acquired through their experience of the
environment in which they live. In particular, they write by drawing
on materials written by others. 185 Moreover, authors write for the
purpose of communicating their thoughts to the external world by
later disseminating their works to the public. From this perspective,
writing is a process of revealing and displaying authors' inner minds
86
to their audiences. 1
Therefore, the need for individuals to both internalize and
externalize knowledge and information makes communicative actions
and public use of reason inextricably intertwined with those of others.
This entitles us to a collective right to participate in intangible public
space. This collective right is necessary in that people perform
communicative actions through the cultural exchange of knowledge
and information in intangible public space. 187 Intangible public space
cannot be divided into separated bits and pieces. This would block
183. See id. at 40 (arguing that "discussion became the medium through which people
appropriated art").
184. See KANT, supra note 181, at 57 ("[A]s a scholar addressing the real public (i.e.
the world at large) through his writings, the clergyman making public use of this reason
enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person.").
185. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1177-98 (2007). Widely recognized as the judge who decided the first
fair use case, Justice Story straightforwardly commented that "[i]n truth, in literature, in
science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows,
and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before."
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
186. For example, Habermas portrays novelists' writing activities as revealing "the
innermost core of the private ... oriented to an audience (Publickum)." See HABERMAS,
supra note 181, at 49.
187. See id. at 27.

2011]

FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE USER RIGHT

171

either internalizing or externalizing of knowledge and information
when individuals perform communicative actions. Maintaining the
openness of intangible public space therefore has intrinsic value for
each member of the public.
The collective right to participate in intangible public space
embodies a legal recognition of knowledge and information as an
essential resource that empowers people to engage in communicative
actions in intangible public space. It protects the collective human
interest in access to and use of informational resources in order to
keep intangible public space open for all. For example, Jefferson
emphatically stated that "[i]f nature has made one thing less
susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of
thinking called an idea.., and like the air in which we breathe, move,
and have our physical being [it is] incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation." 18 Similarly, Justice Brandeis's famous
opinion in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press'1 9 contains a
classic defense of the nature of knowledge and information as an
essential intangible resource for all: "The general rule of law is, that
the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.""19
It is worth noting that intangible public space is different from
the public domain. Copyright lawyers designate the public domain as
an aggregation of information that is not subject to copyright
protection and is thus free for the public to use.1 91 Therefore, they
188. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
189. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
190. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and
Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., winter/Spring 2003, at 89, 91 (arguing that information should be
treated as "nonexclusive property" under Roman law doctrines).
191. See generally BOYLE, supra note 120 (explaining the distinction between public
and private property); THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIc DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE
COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006)
(compiling works by authors seeking to identify the boundaries of the public domain);
Benkler, supra note 7 (explaining the concept of public domain and arguing for less
restrictions on the public domain); Lange, supra note 29, at 147 (defining the public
domain and arguing that growth in the realm of intellectual property has become
"reckless" over time); Litman, supra note 29 (describing the role of the public domain in
copyright law); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183 (2004) (examining private economic reasons for adding to the public domain);
Ochoa, supra note 29 (surveying the history of the public domain); Pamela Samuelson,
Lecture, Enriching Discourseon Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (advocating for
a more concrete consensus amongst scholars as to what constitutes the public domain);
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have used the idea of the public domain to draw the boundary
between anything that falls within copyright holders' proprietary
control and anything that remains free for the public to use. For
example, Professor Jessica Litman defines the public domain as "a
commons that includes those aspects of copyrighted works which
copyright does not protect."' 9I The scope of intangible public space is
broader than that of the public domain. Intangible public space exists
in the world of communicative actions. The need to make public use
of reason through activating the externalization and internalization of
knowledge and information makes it necessary to preserve the
openness of intangible public space for different communicative
actions. Intangible public space covers information flowing in the
public domain. But it may cover information under copyright
protection, if use of such kind of information is necessary for enabling
one to perform a communicative action for public use of reason. For
instance, although information contained in copyrightable works is
under the copyright holders' proprietary control, members of the
public can still invoke the fair use doctrine to use it without the
copyright holder's permission. The discussion in the Section that
follows explains why fair use of information under copyright
protection is essential for people to make public use of reason in
intangible public space.
B.

Nature of the Collective Right to Fair Use

This Section considers why fair use should be reconceptualized
as a collective right regarding access to and use of copyrighted
materials. Moreover, it discusses the nature of the collective right to
fair use in copyright law and argues that a two-tier system should be
created to protect this right.
1. Fair Use in Copyright Law
Fair use should be recognized as a collective right enjoyed by the
public. By nature, it should be regarded as an integral part of
copyright law that functions to defend the public's collective right to
participate in intangible public space. Copyright law regulates
communicative actions and the ways in which people can legally make
public use of their reason. By enacting copyright law, the government

Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the
Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297 (2004) (discussing whether some aspects of
intellectual property are permanently beyond the scope of property law).
192. Litman, supra note 29, at 968.
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accords exclusive ownership in expressive forms of communicative
actions that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. These
express forms mainly include literature, art, film, audio/visual
performances, and television broadcasts that are original under
copyright law.193 Meanwhile, it imposes legal penalties on those who
commit copyright infringement. Consequently, copyright law intends
to encourage people to produce and disseminate more knowledge

and information, which in turn enriches communicative actions in
intangible public space.'94
Given that private ownership inherently carries the power to
exclude, copyright law inevitably acts as a filter that determines the

extent to which knowledge and information should be subject to
private control or remain free for all to use. 195 If a person wants to use
knowledge and information under copyright protection, in general he

first needs to obtain permission from the relevant copyright holder.
Therefore, it follows that only those who can obtain permission from
the copyright holder-for example through paying a license fee-are
allowed to use the material. By operating a legal system that affords

copyright protection, the government inevitably makes a series of
decisions regarding the availability of knowledge and information
that can remain open and free in intangible public space. Therefore,
copyright law by nature functions to determine the degree of the
openness of intangible public space.

193. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
The Supreme Court held that "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
194. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("[Tihe Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Tushnet, supra note 10, at 540-41
("Copyright is undoubtedly an engine of free expression, as it supports both large
corporations and individual artists so that they can afford to be in the business of
speaking." (footnote omitted)).
195. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 118 ("Copyright is speech regulation....
[C]opyright is heavily involved in allocating speech entitlements among various speakers
and categories of speech."); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in
Copyright,83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2005) ("Copyright regulates expressive activity. It
controls the extent to which creators can build upon existing works in order to make
commentary, collage, and other types of iterative creativity. Copyright also influences the
availability and cost of expressive works that can be experienced by readers and other
consumers of creativity.").
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If regarded as a collective right, fair use would keep intangible
public space open to the public and allow for individual or group
participation in communicative actions through the public use of
reason. The exclusive rights vested in copyright holders place certain
pools of knowledge and information under their proprietary control.
The collective right to fair use held by the public under copyright law,
by contrast, causes copyrighted information and knowledge to remain
in intangible public space. It therefore keeps copyrighted materials
open and free to the public to access and use within the ambit of fair
use.' 96 The collective right to fair use prevents information and
knowledge under copyright protection from being absolutely
controlled by copyright holders. To this end, fair use allows the public
to use copyrighted works not only without a copyright holder's
permission but also without paying him remuneration for
unauthorized uses.
With the embrace of the collective right to fair use, copyright law
would be built on the principle that knowledge and information form
an essential resource that empowers people to engage in
communicative actions in intangible public space. The principles of
copyright law would be further reinforced with the necessary
mechanisms to prevent copyright holders from monopolizing certain
pools of information and knowledge by excluding others from
accessing and using them. More importantly, copyright law would not
only accommodate but would also encourage a wide range of human
activities that involve the public use of reason. For example, people
make unauthorized use of copyrighted materials to engage in
research activities, news reporting of current events, or to criticize
publicly-circulating opinions. These activities are of essential
importance for people to realize their collective right to participate in
intangible public space. As Judge Dennis Jacobs cogently puts it,
"[f]air use is not a permitted infringement; it lies wholly outside the
domain protected by the author's copyright."' 9 7
Entitling the public with the collective right to fair use would
institutionalize users' collective status in copyright law. From this
perspective, it aims to reform the copyright holder-centered mode of
copyright law that is prevalent in contemporary society. The
196. Professor Benkler argues that information subject to fair use remains in the public
domain. See Benkler, supra note 7, at 362 ("The public domain is the range of uses of
information that any person is privileged to make absent individualized facts that make a
particular use by a particular person unprivileged.").
197. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J.,
concurring).
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conventional mode of copyright protection remains largely silent on
the legal status of the general public (users of copyrighted works)
with regard to their collective interest in intangible public space. The
Copyright Act contains explicit itemizations of the economic rights
enjoyed by creators of works: (1) reproduction, 9 8 (2) preparation of
derivative works, 199 (3) public distribution, 200 (4) public
performance, 20 1 and (5) the right of public display. 22 Yet the
Copyright Act does not expressly itemize the rights that ought to be
conferred upon members of the public for them to assert collective
interests in using copyrighted works. Not surprisingly, the
conventional mode of copyright protection has given rise to a widelyheld mentality that sees securing adequate protection of economic
rights enjoyed by creators as the highest priority of copyright law.203
The role played by fair use is of pivotal importance to the public,
because copyright law, as shown above, restricts the free flow of
knowledge and information and thereby affects the openness of
intangible public space. The recognition of fair use as a collective
right consolidates the status of users in copyright law. It not only
creates a mandate to mainstream the protection of users' interests
into copyright law, but also transforms such a mandate into a
common platform where legislators and judges endeavor to enhance
users' collective interests in knowledge and information. Based on
this mandate, copyright law should be a legal system designed to
achieve twin objectives: to grant creators exclusive rights over their
works (individual rights) and to protect users' rights (collective rights)
in accessing and using works within the scope of the limitations
imposed on creators' exclusive rights.2 °4
198. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
199. § 106(2).
200. § 106(3).

201. §§ 106(4), (6).
202. § 106(5). While the first three of these rights extend to all types of works, the last
three extend only to selected categories of works.
203. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 25, at 347 ("Copyright doctrine, however, is
characterized by the absence of the user.").
204. For a similar view, see Fair Use Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers): An
EFF FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/IP/eff fair-use-faq.php
(last updated Mar. 21, 2002, 6:00 PM) ("If fair use is viewed as a limitation on the
exclusive rights of copyright holders, fair use can be seen as a scope of positive freedom
available to users of copyrighted material. On this view, fair use is the space which the
U.S. copyright system recognizes between the rights granted to copyright holders and the
rights reserved to the public, where uses of works may or may not be subject to copyright
protection."); Peter Friedman, Why Shepard Fairey's Deceit Should Not Stop the Court
from Finding that the Obama Hope Poster Did Not Infringe the Copyright in the Photo It
was Based on, GENIOCITY.COM (Aug. 12, 2010), http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2010
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2. Nature of Fair Use as a Collective Right
As noted above, fair use as the public's collective right is an
effective legal tool to prevent copyright protection from stifling the
free flow of knowledge and information in intangible public space. To
perform this function, the public's collective right to fair use should
be imbued with three major attributes. First, the collective right is
indivisible. The indivisibility of the collective right to fair use stems
from the public's collective interest in participating in intangible
public space. As a member of the public, each user has a stake in the
flow of knowledge and information, which promotes economic and
cultural development in a free and just society. When it comes to uses
of copyrighted works to make communicative actions in intangible
public space, every member of the public is equally entitled to have
access to and make use of copyrighted works within fair use limits.
Put differently, knowledge and information contained in copyrighted
works are by nature a resource accessible as an integral whole for
members of the public rather than divisible and discrete parts
available to be used only by certain members of the public.
Second, the enjoyment of the collective right to fair use is
relational. One person's exercise of the fair use right promotes not
only his own interests but also others' interests as well. By making fair
uses of copyrighted materials, one disseminates knowledge and
information about economic, political, or cultural aspects of society in
intangible public space. The reception and subsequent uses of
knowledge and information help others to engage in an enriched and
vibrant network of communicative actions in intangible public space.
If a person is not allowed to exercise his fair use rights under a certain
circumstance, this would produce a negative effect that may affect
many others. When others want to exercise their fair use rights in the
same or similar manner, their uses of copyrighted materials would be
deemed infringements of copyrights as well.
Third, the collective right to fair use is inalienable. The
government must provide adequate protection of the public's
collective right to fair use. It should not opt to lower the level of
/08/why-shepard-faireys-deceit-should-not-stop-the-court-from-finding-that-the-obamahope-poster-did-not-infringe-the-copyright-in-the-photo-it-was-based-on/ ("[Flair use is
central to the copyright regime; it is not a tolerated exception to the copyright holder's
domain.").
205. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on
Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1837 (2009) ("[U]sers of that technology are no
longer neutral bystanders [in the digital age because] [i]ndividuals internalize the use of a
new technology and therefore experience loss when a previously 'free' use is banned.").
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protection of this collective right as a tradeoff to strengthen the
protection of the exclusive rights granted to creators of copyrighted
works. From this perspective, the government is responsible for
guaranteeing that there is "no room for a statutory monopoly over
information and ideas. ' ' 206 It is unfair for the government to grant
over-protection of copyright while leaving the public's collective right
to fair use under-protected. Furthermore, the government's action in
allocating the ownership of informational resources through
copyright law must be made only for the protection and promotion of
the public interest. This public interest-oriented requirement fully
comports with James Madison's opinion that copyright is an instance
in which "public good fully coincides ... with the claims of

individuals."2 7 Moreover, this requirement has been recognized by
those courts that proclaimed copyrights
"are limited in nature and
208
must ultimately serve the public good.
C. Realization of the Collective Right to Fair Use
The collective right to fair use necessitates a two-tier system that
adequately accommodates public interests. In this two-tier system, the
collective right to fair use falls into two categories: the identity-based
collective right and the society-based collective right. Both types of
collective rights allow the public to enjoy freedom in asserting
collective interests in utilizing copyrighted works. By imposing a
check on the ability of copyright holders to interfere with users'
copying acts, the collective right to fair use helps users not only lower
the economic cost of making communicative actions but also to
expand their political and cultural liberty to engage in such activities.
The introduction of fair use collective rights into copyright law would
first help counter the copyright holder-centered mentality in
copyright practice. It would further help in thinking about the scope
of rights that the general public ought to enjoy. This would guarantee
that copyright law is fully capable of accommodating the public's
collective interests in participating in intangible public space.
206. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. THE FEDERALIST No.43 (James Madison).
208. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved."); Kenneth Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 607 (2001) ("The framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly intended
that the law of copyright.., would be tailored to serve the advancement of knowledge.").
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1. The Identity-Based Collective Right to Fair Use
First of all, fair users can assert their collective right based on the
identities of the groups in which they take part in a variety of social
and cultural activities. Examples of identity-based groups for fair use
include groups of researchers, educators, and journalists. Each group
of fair users shares collective interests in making use of copyrighted
works to engage in dynamic and capable communicative actions in
intangible public space.
For instance, researchers as a group of fair users may assert the
collective right to fair use in order to facilitate their research-related
activities. Nowadays many kinds of research activities necessitate the
use of various data and arguments contained in copyrighted works
that embody the results of earlier research conducted by other
researchers. Scientific researchers draw on the discoveries or findings
made by their fellow researchers. Social science and humanities
researchers draw on the arguments or viewpoints made by their
fellow researchers. Moreover, educators may assert the collective
right to fair use to enhance their teaching activities. Fair use helps
them lower costs for both students and educational institutions. No
extra expenditure would be needed for students and educational
institutions to negotiate for licenses to use copyrighted works if
educators' uses of them for teaching fall within the ambit of fair use.
Similarly, journalists may assert the collective right to fair use based
on the need to report or evaluate past and current events by drawing
appropriately on copyrighted materials.0 9
This identity-based approach has been used by the Supreme
Court of Canada to interpret the nature of the fair dealing exception,
the Canadian counterpart to the fair use doctrine. In CCH Canadian
21 ° the Court defined researchLtd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
oriented fair dealing as follows:

209. For a similar view, see NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir.
2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring):
Thus a hotelier who stocks each room with photocopies of a newly copyrighted
translation of the Bible is not saved from infringement by his piety; similarly, a
movie reviewer who critiques-and reveals-a surprise ending is not deprived of
the fair use defense by his malice or spite. Nor should a book critic be denied the
fair use protection because she gained access to a prepublication manuscript by
deceit.
210. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004sccl3
/2004sccl3.pdf.
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"Research" must be given a large and liberal interpretationin
order to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained....
...
"Dealing" connotes not individual acts, but a practice or
system. This comports with the purpose of the fair dealing
exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly
in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted
restricted
211
works.

The idea of a group under identity-based fair use rights is by nature
open-ended. The scope of groups may expand or shrink with
technological changes or the relevant economic and social conditions.
The recent controversy over the jailbreaking of smart-phones
illustrates the need to keep the open-ended nature of identity-based
groups for fair use. Jailbreaking a smart-phone, such as the iPhone,
allows individuals to run unapproved applications. To jailbreak, the
user replaces the firmware (the operating system software controlling
basic phone functions) with a modified version. The modified
versions of the code remove any requirement that third-party
applications have completed the approval process. The benefits of
jailbreaking include the capability to utilize additional unapproved
applications and customizations. 212 For some iPhone hobbyists,
jailbreaking "is akin to customizing a fancy car-it simply allows
owners to personalize the look of their devices, turning their phones
into a brag-worthy accessory and status symbol. ' 213 In 2009, there
214
existed about 2.3 million jailbroken iPhones.
However, Apple claimed the practice of jailbreaking infringed its
copyrights. Apple argued the DMCA contains an anti-circumvention
provision that prohibits the act of circumventing a technological
protection measure utilized by a copyright holder to control access to
a copyrighted work.21 5 In July 2010, the Copyright Office, however,
announced that jailbreaking a mobile device was not a DMCA
violation:
211. Id.
51,63 (emphases added).
212. Jenna Wortham, The Great Break-In: A Software Battle over Little Apps Entangles
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at B1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006); Responsive Comment of Apple Inc. in
Opposition to Proposed Exemption 5A and 11A (Class #1) at 11-13, In re Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, No. RM 2008-8 (U.S. Copyright Office Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www
.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/apple-inc-31.pdf.
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When one jailbreaks a smartphone in order to make the
operating system on that phone interoperable with an
independently created application that has not been approved
by the maker of the smartphone or the maker of its operating
system, the modifications that are made purely for the purpose
of such interoperability are fair uses.216

Therefore, a new group of fair users, namely smartphone users who
want to jailbreak their smartphones, was recognized by the Copyright
Office.
2. The Society-Based Collective Right to Fair Use
In addition to the identity-based collective right to fair use, the
public also enjoys a society-based collective right to make fair uses of
copyrighted materials. This type of fair use right is designed to ensure
that the public as a whole can live in a free and just society. It is based
on the overall economic, political, and cultural needs of the society to
which people belong.217 With such a vision, the collective right to fair
use would be reinforced by the following two categories of rights in
regard to protecting the public's collective interests in the openness of

intangible public space.
First, the right to cultural participation undergirds the societybased collective right to fair use. The public has the right to fully
participate in cultural life by allowing its members to freely express
opinions and engage in innovative and creative activities. 218 Culture is
216. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,830 (July 27, 2010) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-27/pdf/2010-18339
.pdf.
217. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 1770-71 (advocating for "preferential treatment in the
fair use calculus to activities that facilitate education-either by enhancing access to
information and argument on matters of public importance or by increasing the ability of
teachers to design and deliver to students the packages of materials they deem most
effective. The more a particular use would advance that end, the more of a boost it should
get."); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A 133,
138 (2003) (discussing the social benefit of educational use where "people other than the
immediate user will benefit from the use, and if the value of these benefits is aggregated
the sum may well exceed the value of alternative uses to the copyright owner").
218. This right has a strong grounding in human rights law. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) places much emphasis on the requirement that
states allow citizens to enjoy full latitude in "freely [participating] in the cultural life of the
community." See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III), at art. 27(1) (Dec. 10, 1948). In this sense, cultural participation
must be free of unreasonable state surveillance, interference, and coercion. Moreover,
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
states shall adopt various measures to "achieve the full realization of [the] right [to
cultural participation]." The measures include "those necessary for the conservation, the
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a product of collective human efforts in creating the behavioral
modes in a society.2 19 Any cultural development stems first from
socialization in public space, through which human beings exchange
ideas in a variety of ways. The very freedom to take part in cultural
life enhances the human ability to think. Thus, the right to cultural
participation nurtures human functional capabilities of "[b]eing able
to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and
producing self-expressive works and events of one's own choice,
0
religious, literary, musical, and so forth.

22

For the protection of this right, the State should facilitate, rather
than impede, individuals' freedom of cultural participation. In this
regard, free speech is the core of a vibrant cultural participation by
the public. The protection of free speech rights further promotes the
realization of positive freedom for all human beings, providing them
with legal protection for expressing their own ideas. It shapes a public
culture in which people can engage in a dynamic discourse of all
social and political issues. For example, Justice Brennan has pointed
out that the free speech right focuses "not only on [its] role of ...
fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas." 22'
Recognized as a fair use of copyrighted works, parody is a classic
example of how individuals can assert their collective interest in fair
use for the purpose of defending their right to cultural participation.
The Supreme Court stated that parody "is the use of some elements
of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in
part, comments on that author's works." 222 Although parody
generally draws on a copyrighted work, it is by nature a "cultural
practice which provides a relatively polemical allusive imitation of

development and the diffusion of science and culture." Moreover, states shall "respect the
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity." International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 15.2-.3, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
219. See, e.g., JERRY D. MOORE, VISIONS OF CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THEORISTS 54 (2004) ("[C]ulture consisted of
learned and shared knowledge and behavior, expressed in such different ways as
technology, social organization, or language.").
220. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 79 (2000).
221. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978)).
222. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
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another cultural production or practice." 223 A series of judicial
judgments have recognized parody as a paradigmatic fair use of
copyrighted materials. 224 It promotes the cultural dynamics of a
society. In particular, it is an important vehicle for people to convey
their critiques of cultural phenomena. Consider parodies of Lady
Gaga's songs. YouTube users have made at least ten parodies of each
of her blockbuster songs. By using her songs as background music,
these parodies either poke fun at Lady Gaga's provocative costumes
or criticize her allegedly unhealthy influence on adolescents.
Second, the right to benefit from technological development also
provides an important justification for viewing the collective right to
fair use as society-based. As the benefits afforded by science and
technology have become an indispensable part of human life, the
right "to share in scientific advancement and its benefits" has been
enshrined in human rights treaties. 2n The public has the right to enjoy
the benefits of technological advances in the creation and
dissemination of knowledge and information. This right guarantees
that technological advances of that type will be encouraged and
protected, and further requires that the State should ensure that the
public has adequate access to these technologies.
For example, reverse engineering for software interoperability is
deemed to be fair use that contributes to developing a free and just
society. Computer programs are generally distributed in machinereadable object code form.226 Their human-readable source code
form, however, is locked by the software developer. This gives rise to
the problem that computer programs may not be able to work
together in a digital environment if software engineers cannot get
access to their object codes to achieve software interoperability for
relevant computer programs. Reverse engineering of computer
223. SIMON DENTITH, PARODY 9 (2000).
224. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (holding that a "parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value" because "it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one"); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[P]arodic works, like other works that comment
and criticize, are by their nature often sufficiently transformative to fit clearly under the
fair use exception" (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the parody will typically fall
within the statutory examples of fair use codified in section 107).
225. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 218, at art. 27(1);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 218, at art.
15.1(b).
226. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992)
("Computer programs, however, are typically distributed for public use in object code
form, embedded in a silicon chip or on a floppy disk.").
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programs for software interoperability enables different software
developers to decompile or disassemble object code contained in
copyrighted computer programs. 22 7 This type of unauthorized copying
activity facilitates the development of new computer programs.2 2 1 It
further protects consumer welfare by guaranteeing the efficient use of
various computer programs in the digital age.
In the above two examples of parody and reverse engineering,
copying works is crucial for members of the general public to
participate in the cultural life of a society and to enjoy the benefits of
technological development.22 9 By providing legal protection of these
activities, the collective right to fair use would foster a vibrant culture
of civic participation in public affairs, thus enriching human
socialization and promoting democratic governance.
IV. ENFORCING FAIR USE AS A COLLECTIVE RIGHT
The preceding Part put forward a new theory that shows how
and why fair use, conventionally defined as an individual right to raise
an affirmative defense in copyright infringement cases, should be
reconceptualized as a collective user right. This Part considers the
extent to which treating fair use as a collective right will help defend
the public interest. For this purpose, I argue that two sets of new legal
frameworks should be used in the adjudication of fair use cases: (1)
an introduction of the public interest test in applying the four-factor
fair use analysis; and (2) a limited reversal of the burden of proof to
copyright holders.
A.

The Public Interest Test

As demonstrated in Part II, the treatment of fair use as an
individual right has led judges and legislators to ignore the need to
227. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608-09 (2002) ("From this approximation of source
code, reverse engineers can discern or deduce internal design details of the program, such
as information necessary to develop a program that will interoperate with the decompiled
or disassembled program.").
228. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 (holding that reverse engineering "has led to an
increase in the number of independently designed video game programs offered for use
with the [plaintiff's] console").
229. For further discussion of the importance of information exchange to cultural
development, see, for example, ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 248-99

(1998); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REv. 547, 550 (2006) ("Musical borrowing,
which includes a range of practices from copying to more subtle influences, is a pervasive
aspect of musical production."); Tushnet, supranote 10, at 562-81.
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weigh the broader social values of using copyrighted works for the
public interest. 20 Instead, they have treated fair use cases as involving
the competing claims of the individual copyright holder and the
individual user. In consequence, analysis of the public interest has
generally been absent in the judicial application of the fair use
doctrine, although a very limited number of cases have used a
narrower idea of the public interest.23 '
By contrast, protecting fair use as a collective right would require
an introduction of a public interest test in the adjudication of fair use
cases. The three major attributes of the enjoyment of the collective
right to fair use, namely that it is indivisible, relational, and
inalienable, 23 2 indicate that fair use produces far-reaching effects on
the interests of different groups of users or society at large. From this
perspective, the collective right approach would reshape fair use cases
by protecting not only the individual fair user but also other potential
fair users who might use the copyrighted work as well. In this sense,
fair use protects the public's group interest or social interest in using a
copyrighted work without the copyright holder's authorization. 33
The public interest test would require courts to use a broadbased approach to interpret the fair use doctrine and further to
sufficiently consider the public interest in rendering judicial decisions.
Rather than focusing only on individual interests, courts should look
broadly to the spectrum of public interests and consider whether an
individual act of copying works has any bearing on public access to
and use of knowledge and information flowing in intangible public
space. 3
230. See supra text accompanying notes 94-105.
231. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that "the [wide]
public exhibition of art ... 'benefits the broader public interest' " (quoting Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting))); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Marcus, J., concurring) (pointing out that if copyright holders had the right to prevent
others from making parody of their works, that would have made "a policy that would
extend intellectual property protection into the precincts of censorship" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding in favor of fair use in part because "[t]here is a public interest in
having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy").
232. See supraPart III.B.2.
233. See supra Part III.C (dividing fair use collective rights into group identity-based
rights and society-based rights).
234. See, e.g., ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS:
THE DIGITAL IMPACT 280 (2005) (proposing that the limitations on copyright should be
seen as users' rights and that it "can be objected that different users' rights are justified by
very different societal interests"); Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 53
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Courts can apply the public interest test in two ways. First, they
may use the public interest test as an additional factor to supplement
the four fair use factors. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have
admitted that section 107 "notes four nonexclusive factors to be
considered. ' 235 Section 107's factors are nonexclusive because the fair
use doctrine "is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be
decided on its own facts." 6 Therefore, it is permissible for courts to
go beyond the four fair use factors as listed in section 107.
Additionally, treating fair use as a collective user right also
necessitates the use of the public interest test. The four fair use
factors do not contain built-in measures to enforce fair use as a
collective user right. As shown in Parts I and II, directed by the four
factor analysis, courts have shaped fair use as an individual right
enjoyed by each user.2 37 Even though some courts have relied on the
transformativeness test as part of first factor to protect the public
interest, 3 s this judicial practice has long been overshadowed by other
courts' emphasizing the fourth factor as the core of the fair use
analysis.2 39 The fourth factor, as the statutory language shows, is
(2004) ("To make intellectual property consistent with the idea of free speech as
democratic culture, there must be a robust and ever expanding public domain with
generous fair use rights. Intellectual property also must not be permitted to create
chokepoints or bottlenecks in the spread of knowledge and the distribution of culture.");
Samuelson, supra note 3, at 2566-67 ("Courts should give greater weight to the public's
interest in access to the information the defendant's use would make available....
Particularly in cases involving free speech and free expression values, courts can and
should give more consideration to the public interest in access to the defendants'
expression."); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 331 (2006) (arguing that
"[ilntellectual property is about social relations and should serve human values").
235. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
236. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
237. See supra Parts I-I.
238. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding
that "parody has an obvious claim to transformative value" because "it can provide social
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one");
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.corn, 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that "a search
engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely,
an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be more transformative than a
parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a
parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.").
239. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 ("This last factor is undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use."); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99
F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The four statutory factors may not have been created
equal. In determining whether a use is 'fair,' the Supreme Court has said that the most
important factor is the fourth, the one contained in 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).... We take it that
this factor, 'the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work,' is at least primus inter pares, figuratively speaking, and we shall turn to it first.");
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intended to protect the market value of copyrighted works. 240
Therefore, courts have applied the four-factor fair use analysis with
implied favoritism for copyright holders. The use of the public
interest test, therefore, would function to neutralize this favoritism.
Second, courts should examine the extent to which identitybased and society-based public interests are affected in fair use
cases.141 Courts may first identify the identity-based group to which
users of copyrighted works belong, or the larger social benefits that
may be generated by the unauthorized use of copyrighted works. In
this way, courts may place themselves in a better position to consider
the extent to which the unauthorized use of copyrighted works affects
the protection of the larger group members' interests or promotes the
creation of social benefits.
This broad-based interpretive method has been adopted in
Canada. In construing the nature of the fair dealing exception, the
counterpart of the United States fair use doctrine in Commonwealth
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized the public
interest test as follows:
The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the
Copyright Act, is a user's right. In order to maintain the proper
balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users'
interests, it must not be interpretedrestrictively....
"Research" must be given a large and liberal interpretation
in order to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained.

"Dealing" connotes not individual acts, but a practice or
system. This comports with the purpose of the fair dealing
exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly
restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted
works.242

see also Beebe, supra note 37, at 617 (showing that "59.0% of the opinions following
Harper& Row (but preceding Campbell) explicitly cited this proposition.... [Campbell's]
intervention had a modest effect on the lower courts.... Of the opinions following
Campbell, 26.5% continued explicitly to state that factor four was the most important
factor.").
240. See supra text accompanying note 35.
241. See supra Part III.C.
242. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399 (Can.),
1 48, 51, 63 (emphases added), availableat http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004sccl3
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By giving judicial recognition to the idea of fair dealing as a user's
right, rather than a defense, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly
embraced a broad-based approach to interpreting the scope of the
fair dealing doctrine in order to protect the public interest. For
instance, the Court noted that research as a permitted fair dealing in
Canadian copyright law encompasses not only an individual research
activity but also "a practice or system"24' 3 of doing research, which is a

collective activity in which others participate as a group of
researchers. From this perspective, the public interest requirement
used in this decision comports with the group identity-based
collective right to fair use discussed in Part III.2
The introduction of the public interest test in American
copyright law would further transform the judicial protection of fair
use rights in the following three major ways. First, it would change the
way in which courts deal with the role of the transformativeness
element in the fair use doctrine. In determining the outcome of a fair
use case, courts have increasingly emphasized the role of
transformative use that "adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message." 45 For example, the Supreme Court in Campbell said
that "the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use. ' With a series of later judgments
following Campbell, it has become common for courts to see
transformative use of a work as presumptively fair use.247 While
transformative uses deserve heightened judicial protection, many
courts have taken it for granted that a nontransformative use of a
work may amount to an infringement of copyright.24 s The justification
/2004sccl3.pdf.
243. Id.
244. See supra Part III.C.1.
245. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
246. Id.
247. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003)
("The Supreme Court has recognized that parodic works, like other works that comment
and criticize, are by their nature often sufficiently transformative to fit clearly under the
fair use exception."); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The
more transformative the new work, the less important the other factors, including
commercialism, become."); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 127174 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[C]onsideration of [the transformative nature of the parody]
certainly militates in favor of a finding of fair use, and, informs our analysis of the other
factors.").
248. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 715, 715 (2011) ("[S]ince 2005 the transformative use paradigm has come
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is that, unlike transformative uses, nontransformative uses simply
copy the original copyrighted works and thereby make no new

contributions to enrich culture. Against this backdrop, courts have
repeatedly ruled that nontransformative uses, including simple
photocopying even in scientific or educational

settings, could

potentially militate against a finding of fair use.249 Courts have even
ruled that any sampling from a sound recording infringed the
copyright in the sampled recording.25 °
The use of the public interest test would reverse the trend of
affording weak protection to nontransformative uses, and it would
require courts to protect more nontransformative uses. For cases
involving nontransformative uses such as copying for educational and
research purposes, courts need to examine the social implications of
overwhelmingly to dominate fair use doctrine [in the courts], bringing to fruition a shift
towards the transformative use doctrine that began a decade earlier."); Tushnet, supra
note 10, at 555 ("While extrajudicial and structural limits to copyright are under attack,
fair use law has been realigned around transformative use, in which the user does more
than simply copy the original work." (footnote omitted)).
249. See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data., Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding that absence of transformative use in a case involving translation of
news items weighed heavily against fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a for-profit copyshop may not
claim fair use where the copies were made under contract with an educational institution);
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Rather than
making some contribution of new intellectual value and thereby fostering the
advancement of the arts and sciences, an untransformed copy is likely to be used simply
for the same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby providing limited justification for a
finding of fair use."); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989)
(explaining that when a work possesses the "same intrinsic purpose" as a preexisting work,
that in turn "moves the balance of the calibration of the first factor" against the copier and
"seriously weakens a claimed fair use"); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55669, at *75 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2000) ("Conversely, the amount and
substantiality of the copying and the lack of any significant transformation of the articles
").Moreover, courts have repeatedly held that
weigh heavily in favor of plaintiffs ....
nontransformative uses should be presumed to cause market harm. This makes it unlikely
for courts to rule that such nontransformative uses are non-infringing. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Because, on the
facts presented, [defendants'] use of The Cat in the Hat original was nontransformative,
and admittedly commercial, we conclude that market substitution is at least more certain,
and market harm may be more readily inferred."); Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West Publ'g Co.,
924 F. Supp. 918, 929 (D. Minn. 1996) ("Because Oasis' proposed CD-ROM product is
nontransformative, the Court presumes market harm to West."); Laura G. Lape,
Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factorin Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV.
677, 716-17 (1995) (explaining how courts "import" market considerations into the
transformative analysis under the first factor and more readily find market harm when use
is nontransformative).
250. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir.
2005) ("If you cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you 'lift' or 'sample'
something less than the whole[?] Our answer to that question is in the negative.").
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such uses, as they do for transformative uses. Nontransformative uses,
in many cases, carry strong positive implications for promoting the
users' group-based or society-based values as discussed in Part 111.251
Commentators have contended that "[pure] copying is of value to
audiences who have access through copying to otherwise unavailable
speech. It also enhances copiers' ability to express themselves; to
persuade others; and to participate in cultural, religious, and political
institutions. ' 25 2 Therefore, courts should also consider the extent to
which the public interest should be protected when dealing with cases
involving nontransformative uses of copyrighted works. 253 For this
purpose, they should consider whether nontransformative uses may
produce benefits for any specific group of users or protect larger
social interests.
Second, the use of the public interest test would require courts to
give an equal treatment to parody and satire. Starting with the
Campbell decision, courts have extended greater fair use protection
to parody than satire, because "[p]arody needs to mimic an original to
make its point ... whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so
requires justification for the very act of borrowing." "254 This
dichotomous approach triggers a judicial inquiry that gives
diametrically different treatments to parody and satire. If a use
arguably criticized or commented on the original work and a parodic
character reasonably can be perceived, a court could easily conclude
the use was fair. By contrast, if the original work is used only as a
vehicle to criticize something else, for example society in general, the
new work is a satire rather than a parody and therefore could
potentially militate against a finding of fair use.255 Informed by this
parody/satire distinction, the Ninth Circuit denied a fair use defense
in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books.2 56 In this case, the
defendant's book mimicked the style of The Cat in the Hat while
251. See supraPart III.C.
252. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 562.
253. Professor Boon argues that copying is an essential part of being human, because
"many of the most vibrant aspects of contemporary culture indicate an obsession with the
act of copying and the production of copies, and it seems that we find real insight into
what human beings and the universe are like through thinking about how and what we
copy." MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 4 (2010).
254. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994).
255. See Maureen McCrann, Note, A Modest Proposal: GrantingPresumptive Fair Use
Protection for Musical Parodies, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 96, 106 (2009) ("In
failing to clearly address the issues surrounding satirical expression, the Campbell decision
created the potential for lower courts to exclude protection for all forms of satire,
regardless of the amount of parodic material present.").
256. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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retelling the facts of the O.J. Simpson murder trial.2 57 The court ruled
that the defendant's book was a satire, not a parody, because it did
not poke fun at or ridicule The Cat in the Hat.258 Instead, it merely
used the characters and style of The Cat in the Hat to tell the story of
the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Therefore, the book was not deemed
fair use. 259

The use of the public interest test would eliminate the
parody/satire distinction. It would suggest that courts should give
equal treatment to parody and satire. Rather than treating satire
unfavorably, courts should broadly examine the political or artistic
values that may underlie a satirical use of a copyrighted work. It has
been recognized that satire is a powerful form of social criticism that
uses wit and ridicule as its weapon. 260 From this perspective, satire
comports with the society-based values that are intended to be
promoted by the collective right to fair use for a free and just society.
The Second Circuit took the lead in breaking the parody/satire
distinction by integrating a public interest test to examine whether
satirical uses of copyrighted materials can produce any larger social
benefits. In Blanch v. Koons,261 the court held that the satirical use of
a portion of a photo in a collage, by the acclaimed visual artist Jeff
Koons, qualified as fair use. The court explained that the copyright
holder's photo was "fodder for [the user's] commentary on social and
aesthetic consequences of mass media, 2 62 for which "the use of an
existing image advanced his artistic purposes. ' 263 The court further
reinforced its fair use ruling by noting that "the public exhibition of
art [through satirical use] is widely ... considered to 'have value that

benefits the broader public interest.'

26

257. Id. at 1396.
258. Id. at 1401.
259. Id. at 1402-03.
260. See DUSTIN GRIFFIN, SATIRE: A CRITICAL REINTRODUCTION 1 (1994) ("A work
of satire is designed to attack vice or folly. To this end it uses wit or ridicule.").
261. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
262. Id. at 253.
263. Id. at 255.
264. Id. at 254 (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.
1994)). The court also noted the need to give full deference to the artist's justification for
making satirical use of the copyrighted work by stating that "[a]lthough it seems clear
enough to us that Koons's use of a slick fashion photograph enables him to satirize life as
it appears when seen through the prism of slick fashion photography, we need not depend
on our own poorly honed artistic sensibilities." Id. at 255. In this case, Koons asserted his
justification for the satirical use of the copyrighted photo as follows:
"To me, the legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world,
something that everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone's legs in
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Third, the public interest test would also help courts provide
adequate judicial protection of fair use rights that have been undercut
by the passage of the DMCA. As noted in Part II, the DMCA
restricts the exercise of fair use rights by foreclosing the invocation of
fair use as the legal basis to circumvent technological measures that
digitally lock up copyrighted works. However, the recent controversy
over jailbreaking the iPhone and especially the report issued by the
Copyright Office on this matter, indicate that it is necessary to
accommodate fair uses in the anti-circumvention regulations. 265 The
copyright office felt that jailbreaking would promote consumer
welfare by allowing iPhone users to enjoy greater freedom in using
the iPhone.266 Moreover, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
in 2004 that the DMCA never "rescinded the basic bargain granting
the public noninfringing and fair uses of copyrighted materials. ' ' 267 In
rendering this decision, the court emphasized that "[c]opyright law
itself authorizes the public to make certain uses of copyrighted
materials. Consumers who purchase a product containing a copy of
embedded software have the inherent legal right to use that copy of
' 26
the software. 8
The public interest test would help courts buttress their policybased rulings to preserve fair use rights under the DMCA. The test
would help courts examine whether the protection of fair use rights is
needed in DMCA-related cases. Courts may first identify the group
of users that section 107 of the Copyright Act is intended to protect.
Had the iPhone jailbreaking case been petitioned to a court first, the
court could have identified users of smartphones who want to
jailbreak them as a group of people. They could have further
considered that their collective interest in jailbreaking smartphones is
strong enough to deserve fair use protection. With respect to the issue
concerning the compatibility of fair use and the DMCA, courts may
inquire into whether a sheer prohibition of circumvention activities
would lead to a blanket denial of fair use rights. They may further
particular. By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my painting, I thus
comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure
Magazine. By using an existing image, I also ensure a certain authenticity or
veracity that enhances my commentary-it is the difference between quoting and
paraphrasing-and ensure that the viewer will understand what I am referring to."
Id. (quoting Koons Aff. 5,396 F. Supp. 2d 476 S.D.N.Y. (2006)).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 212-16.
266. Wortham, supra note 212.
267. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
268. Id.
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examine whether this sweeping exclusion of fair use protection from
the DMCA may harm the general public interest by allowing
copyright holders to impede public access to works protected by
technological measures.
B. Limited Reversal of the Burden of Proof
As pointed out in Part II, when treated as an individual right, fair
use only entitles a user to raise an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement. It thus follows that the burden to prove fair
use is placed on the user after the copyright owner establishes a prima
facie case of copyright infringement. But this procedural rule has
harmed the public interest in various ways. For instance, it has simply
reduced fair use to a right to hire a lawyer. The rule has also made it
increasingly difficult for users to defend their interests, as it increases
litigation costs and breeds aggressive copyright claims by content
owners.

269

Treating fair use as a collective right would necessitate a limited
reversal of the burden of proof in fair use cases. 20 It would relieve
users of their burden of proof if their uses are made for
noncommercial purposes. Against this backdrop, the burden of proof
should instead be placed on the copyright holder. Thus, the new
general rule would require the copyright holder to establish the
existence of a prima facie case of copyright infringement as well as
the non-existence of fair use if the use was made for a noncommercial
purpose. If the copyright holder can prove that his copyrighted work
was used for a commercial purpose, the burden of proof on fair use
would be shifted to the user. In sum, whether the use of the
copyrighted work is for a commercial purpose should determine who
269. See supra text accompanying notes 121-31, 132-39.
270. My proposal on the limited reversal of the burden of proof is different from the
call for a general reversal of the burden of proof. For example, Pamela Samuelson argues
that in fair use cases the burden of proof should in general be placed on the copyright
holders:
Given the important role that fair use plays in mediating tensions between
copyright law and the First Amendment and other constitutional values, it would
be appropriate for the burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright owner.
When deciding whether to challenge a use as infringement, rights holders often
anticipate that fair use will be at issue in the case, and they are typically in a better
position than defendants to offer proof on key issues pertinent to fair use, such as
the likelihood of harm to the market.
Samuelson, supra note 3, at 2617; see also Liu, supra note 41, at 443 (arguing the case for
shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs in fair use cases based on the fact that the burden
of proof is generally placed on plaintiffs in defamation-related free speech cases).
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bears the burden of proof. A commercial use would leave the burden
of proof for fair use on the user; a noncommercial use would place the
burden of proof on the copyright holder.
The limited reversal of the burden of proof is grounded in the
collective right to fair use enjoyed by the public. Fair use as a
collective right can carry such a weight because case law indicates that
*a fair use, as demonstrated in Part 111,271 involves the need to protect
not only the interest of an individual fair user but also other potential
fair users who might use the copyrighted work. From this perspective,
the prioritization of protecting the fair use right is designed to protect
the public interest. Judge Posner's observation succinctly captures
why it is important to prioritize the public interest:
If there is an asymmetry in copyright, it is one that actually
favors defendants. The successful assertion of a copyright
confirms the plaintiff's possession of an exclusive, and
sometimes very valuable, right, and thus gives it an incentive to
spend heavily on litigation. In contrast, a successful defense
against a copyright claim, when it throws the copyrighted work
into the public domain, benefits all users of the public domain,
not just the defendant; he obtains no exclusive right and so his
incentive to spend on defense is reduced and he may be forced
into an unfavorable settlement.272
The above observation shows that the limited shifting of the burden
of proof in fair use cases would protect users who may have
contributed to the protection of the public interest. It relieves them of
an extra burden for their public interest-benefiting activities. In this
way, this procedural rule would pave the way for courts to engage in
more expansive scrutiny of the subtleties and nuances of the public
interest that they should promote and protect in fair use cases.
Moreover, the limited shift of the burden of proof would
significantly reduce users' litigation costs. This would encourage
members of the public to assert their rights more actively and
spontaneously rather than simply succumb to copyright holders'
demands for license fees. First, it would enable users to pay lower
attorney's fees for, and to spend less time in, gathering, processing,
and presenting evidence in litigation. Commentators have pointed out
that courts can use burden of proof rules to reduce or even minimize
litigation costs for one of the parties involved in a dispute. This is
because "the burden of proof, by giving one party the task of
271. See supra text accompanying notes 222-28.
272. Eagle Servs. Corp. v. H20 Indus. Servs., Inc., 532 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008).
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producing evidence, relieves his opponent to some extent of that
task-thereby saving expenditures that might otherwise be incurred
by the opponent. ' 27 3 Moreover, the limited shift of the burden of
proof would require copyright holders to submit evidence to support
their claims against putative fair users in cases involving
noncommercial uses of works. Thus, it would create hurdles for
copyright holders to overclaim their rights in this type of fair use
case. 274 Additionally, it would deter copyright holders' aggressive
litigation strategy to sue innocent fair users for the purpose of
preventing or stopping them from using their copyrighted works.275
These functions of the limited shift of the burden of proof would
ensure fair users' activities are not unduly hampered by the
exceedingly complex, lengthy, and costly litigation process.
In fact, the limited reversal of the burden of proof has been used
by courts before. The Supreme Court in its Sony decision suggested
that, at least where noncommercial uses are concerned, the defendant
may enjoy a presumption that the use does not harm the market for
the original work. 7 6 This presumption arises because noncommercial

uses are less likely to reduce economic incentives for the copyright
holder to create and disseminate a new work. Nor are they likely to
cause market substitution of their works.277 Therefore, it follows that
noncommercial users do not need to bear the burden of proving that

273. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An
Economic Perspective,26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 413 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
274. Professor Samuelson points out that
the current legal structure makes it possible for an aggressive copyright owner to
overclaim rights and to force good faith users or follow-on creators to defend a use
as falling within the complex web of existing limitations and exceptions.
Overclaiming can impose high litigation costs, including risks of statutory damage
awards, and thereby chill some uses that if challenged would ultimately be found
non-infringing.
Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L. 1175, 1210 (2010).
275. For discussion of this strategic litigation behavior, see supra text accompanying
notes 133-36.
276. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) ("A
challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work.").
277. In Sony, the copyright owner failed to provide any empirical evidence that
noncommerical use had either reduced its viewership or negatively impacted its business.
See id.
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their use would not cause harm to the market value of copied work.278
In this context, the burden of proof should instead rest on the
copyright holder. According to the Supreme Court's Sony decision,
"[a copyright holder's] challenge to a noncommercial use of a

copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."279

Several earlier cases used similar reasoning. The copyright
holder was required to assume the burden to prove that
noncommercial uses would cause harm to its market."0 Yet, such a
limited reversal of the burden of proof was abandoned by courts as
they gradually shifted to embrace a fixed characterization of fair use

as an affirmative defense. 2" Against this backdrop, courts altered the
procedural rule to have fair use function as an affirmative defense in
copyright disputes.'

The re-establishment of the limited reversal of

the burden of proof-a rule utilized in earlier cases-is thus both a
practically feasible and theoretically viable option for handling fair
use cases.
C. Responses to Criticisms

The following Section responds to potential criticisms that are
likely to be leveled at the reconceptualization of fair use as a
collective right. In particular, it shows why the use of the new legal

approaches discussed in the preceding two sections would not cause
the problems that critics may envisage.
278. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 974 (2007) ("[F]air use doctrine's role historically was to excuse
uses that cause no foreseeable harm to the copyright owner.").
279. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
280. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13 (N.D. Cal. 1896) (ruling in favor of the
defendant on grounds that the plaintiff, "on whom the burden of proof lies," had failed to
show that the defendant's use of the copyrighted material concerned was unfair). For
discussion of earlier cases in which the courts put the burden of proof on plaintiffs, see
Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use 18-21 (Aug. 18, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1659855 (discussing the earlier cases in which courts placed the burden of proof
on copyright holders in fair use cases).
281. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217,226-27 (D.
Mass. 2009) (concluding that the subsequent Supreme Court Campbell decision dispelled
the notion that noncommercial use is presumptively fair use, which was suggested in its
Sony decision, and therefore the defendant needs to bear the burden of proof in fair use
cases).
282. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) ("No
'presumption' or inference of market harm that might find support in Sony is applicable to
a case involving something beyond mere duplication for commercial purposes.").
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1. Problems in Asserting the Collective Right to Fair Use
If the public at large is bestowed with a collective right to fair use
under section 107 of the Copyright Act, does it follow that any
member of the public has standing to bring suit against a party who
has infringed this collective right? Critics may argue that the
collective right mode of fair use protection would contravene the
traditional notion of standing, which requires that a party must have
suffered a "concrete and particularized" injury to bring suit. 283
Central to this rule is the requirement that a plaintiff must have been
affected in a "personal and individual way 2z84 and the relief he seeks
' in a manner distinct
would "directly and tangibly benefit[] him"285
286
from its impact on "the public at large.
If a user of copyrighted
works sues solely on the grounds of the collective right to fair use, it is
unlikely that he can demonstrate that this requirement has been
satisfied. Fair use as a collective right protects group or social
interests in utilizing works. Entitling any user of copyrighted works to
have standing to sue, in this context, would violate the
aforementioned requirement. Worse still, it would further alter the
conventional mode of fair use cases by opening the door to allow the
user of copyrighted works to sue the copyright holder. In a typical fair
use case decided on the basis of section 107 of the Copyright Act, it is
the copyright holder who brings suit against the user, claiming that he
has suffered injuries caused by unauthorized use of his copyrighted
works.
Criticism of this kind, however, does not capture the dynamics of
protecting users' interests under section 107. If defined as the legal
basis for creating a collective right to fair use, section 107 would
entitle any user of copyrighted works to have standing to bring two
kinds of lawsuits. First, any individual user can bring suit against a
party who has harmed his own individual interest regarding fair use of
relevant copyrighted works. The party whom a user has standing to
sue includes a copyright holder or a third party who may have unduly
restricted his ability to exercise a fair use right. For example, under
the DMCA, users can circumvent the technological measures
deployed by copyright holders for making limited fair uses 287 such as
283. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
284. Id. at 560 n.1.
285. Id. at 574.
286. Id.
287. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d), (f), (g), (J) (2006); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[Congress] created a series of exceptions to aspects of Section 1201(a) [of the DMCA]
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jailbreaking smartphones. m But if a copyright holder utilizes
additional technological measures intentionally designed to disable
the smartphones that are jailbroken or a particular device that
prevents users from jailbreaking their smartphones, a user can sue the
copyright holder for infringing his fair use right. The collective right
of fair use would entitle the user to do so, because he has suffered "a
concrete and particularized" injury to his enjoyment of the fair use
right.
The second type of lawsuit a user can bring on the basis of the
collective right to fair use would target the actions taken by the
government or copyright holders that may affect the fair use interests
of all users. For example, a user can bring suit to challenge the
validity of the DMCA on the grounds that it may have severely
undercut the enjoyment of the fair use right by all users in the digital
age. Similarly, a user can even bring suit to challenge the validity of
the notices commonly used by publishers, such as "No part of this
book can be reproduced without the permission of the publisher." He
can argue that notices of this kind would negatively affect the fair use
rights of all users, because the publishers intentionally exaggerated
the scope of their copyrights and threatened users to give up their fair
use right. As one scholar has argued, "In creating a civil liability
scheme to deal with [false copyright claims made by holders],
Congress should grant broad standing to bring legal claims....
[L]imiting standing to parties who can demonstrate personal injury
will likely be insufficient to respond to the broad problem of [false
'
copyright claims]." 289
Under these scenarios, a user also has standing to bring suit
because the adverse impacts on other users are fairly traceable. A
valid fair use interest enjoyed by a particular user has intrinsic value
for any other members of a group who have group-based fair use
rights or members of the public who have society-based fair use
rights. If the user is prohibited from, or faces threats of alleged
infringement, others would be treated in the same manner. Because a
chain of causation exists between the government's or copyright
holder's action and the users' injuries, a user therefore would have
standing to bring suit against the government or the copyright holder.
The collective right to fair use, in this context, entitles a user to have
for certain uses that Congress thought 'fair,' including reverse engineering, security
testing, good faith encryption research, and certain uses by nonprofit libraries, archives
and educational institutions.").
288. See supra text accompanying note 216.
289. Mazzone, supra note 133, at 1078.
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standing to sue. As shown in Parts II and III, fair use entails that
users' interests in making fair uses are interdependent and relational.
Thus, fair use requires judges to examine broadly the impact of use
restrictions on a user of copyrighted works.
This liberal interpretation of the injury requirement in the
standing doctrine has been adopted by the Supreme Court in its
recent Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)29
decision. In this case, the Court upheld a plaintiff's standing to sue for
injury caused by the EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions that were alleged to have caused global warming. The
Court stated that a particularized injury as a basis for entitling a
plaintiff to sue should include not only an "actual"29' 1 injury but also
' injury.
an "imminent"292
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that standing
does not require a showing of economic injury. Rather, injuries can
"reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as
economic values" and can be widely shared among the population.2 93
The collective right to fair use comports with this broad interpretation
of the nature of injury. It protects the aesthetic value of fair uses such
as the use of copyrighted works in arts schools for educational
purposes. It also protects the recreational value of fair uses such as
the use of copyrighted works for making parodies. Fair uses protected
by the collective right mode also include broader political and social
uses, such as the protection of freedom of expression and the
promotion of cultural participation.
2. Under-Protection of Copyright Holders' Interests
Another potential criticism is that the broad fair use protection
generated by the collective right approach would tip the balance in
copyright law toward users at large. This would result in an
inadequate and ineffective protection of copyright holders, decreasing
the output of copyrighted material that could be circulated to the
public. Moreover, critics may worry that courts would give too much
power to users' collective rights. This would also result in the judicial
imposition of too onerous a burden on copyright holders to
accommodate fair uses.

290. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
291. Id. at 521 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
292. Id. at 542-43.
293. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,154 (1970)).
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These are legitimate concerns. Yet the protection of the
collective right to fair use would not necessarily lead to an underinterests. Instead, the
protection of copyright holders'
reconceptualization of fair use as a collective right and its
corresponding legal protections for fair use rights contain safeguards
designed to prevent the under-protection of copyright holders'
interests.
First of all, courts would still be required to engage in the fourfactor analysis to determine the outcome of a fair use case.294 As
discussed above, the public interest test is a supplementary factor to
the conventional four-factor fair use analysis.295 Thus, courts would
still examine the extent to which the use of a work may affect the
copyright holder's market. This inquiry, as courts have pointed out,
ensures that fair uses would not cause market substitution of
copyright holders' works.296

Second, the public interest test cannot be used in a manner that
would eliminate the need for conducting the market effect inquiry
that constitutes the fourth factor of the fair use analysis. Rather, the
test is intended to be used as an additional weighing factor that
prevents courts from giving an undue weight to the market effect
factor or interpreting too broad a scope of the potential market for
the copyright holder's work.297 The overemphasis on the fourth factor,
especially the harm to the potential market, as commentators have
pointed out, "can inappropriately skew the fair use analysis to favor
the rights of copyright owners." 298 Professor Lemley's
groundbreaking article has demonstrated that all "[e]fforts to permit
intellectual property owners to fully internalize the benefits of their
creativity [through their proprietary control] will inevitably get the
'
From this
balance [of intellectual property protection] wrong." 299

294. For the four fair use factors, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
295. See supra Part IV.A.
296. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) ("[lIt is as
clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, not to
criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it,
such a use will be deemed in law a piracy."). The Supreme Court followed this approach in
its Sony, Harper& Row, and Campbell decisions.
297. In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.corn, the court interpreted the scope of the copyright
holder's market and the concept of harm to the market restrictively. It held that the
plaintiff's claim of "the potential market for the downloading of [its] reduced-size images
onto cell phones" was hypothetical and therefore ruled that the ascertained harm to the
plaintiff's market remained hypothetical as well. See 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
298. Loren, supra note 11, at 30.
299. Lemley, supra note 119, at 1032.
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perspective, the public interest test is a bar to providing
overprotection of copyright holders' interests.
Third, the limited reversal of the burden of proof in fair use cases
only shifts the burden of proof to the copyright holder when the work
is used for noncommercial purposes. Therefore, it has very limited
impact on the copyright holder because noncommercial users are not
likely to cause harm to the market for their works."°
3. Pitfalls of Protecting Privacy and Personal Uses
Critics may also cast doubt on whether defining fair use as a
collective right can comport with all varieties of the existing
categories of fair use. In particular, they may point to personal uses of
copyrighted works that are traditionally recognized as fair uses.
Examples of personal uses include copying works for time-shifting
purposes such as using a video tape recorder to record a television
show the user will watch at a later time,301 and for space-shifting
purposes such as using a device to download MP3 audio files from a
computer and to listen to them elsewhere. 3°2 Personally uses preserve
users' anonymity, which "permits these activities to go forward, and
allows fair users to decide later whether to reveal their identities
when releasing their work."3 3 Therefore, personal uses protect users'
right to privacy, a right that has been long regarded as an individual
right.
The collective right of fair use, however, would not necessarily
wipe out personal uses from its ambit of protection. In fact, personal
uses are compatible with the collective right of fair use. The need to
protect privacy as a "right to be let alone"3" should not necessarily be

300. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79.
301. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,454-55 (1984) (holding
that verbatim copying for time-shifting purposes is fair use). In Sony, the Supreme Court
ruled that "time-shifting" of copyrighted television shows with video tape recorders
(VTR) constituted fair use primarily because it did not have negative effects on the
current as well as the potential market for the copyrighted works. Id. at 456.
302. Relying upon Sony, the court in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc. held that copying for space-shifting purposes is "paradigmatic
noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the [Copyright] Act."
180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004,
1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the ruling that space shifting was fair use); UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
303. Julie E.Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 598 (2003); see
also Litman, supra note 25, at 1872-74 (discussing the relationship between fair use and
personal use of copyrighted words).
304. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
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reduced to an individual right alone. The right of privacy carries a
social dimension in its theoretical and policy underpinnings: when
privacy protects individuals, it does so not only for their benefit, but
for the common good of society as well. Understood in this way, the
protection of privacy is a central feature integrated into our social
structure, one that "is valuable not only for our personal lives, but for
as citizens--our participation in public and community
our lives
305
life."

Protecting personal users under the framework of collective
rights of fair use reflects this broad, pragmatic understanding of the
right of privacy. Fair users can claim their interests in making
personal uses either on group-based or society-based fair use rights.
The relevant group of users can still assert their group interest in
preserving their privacy while copying works for time-shifting
purposes. Moreover, fair users can also assert their social interest in
protecting privacy as a central need for maintaining a free and just
society.
CONCLUSION

Fair use is one of the greatest mechanisms for enriching human
society. It sustains and enhances both cultural dynamics and political
democracy in a free and just society. Fair use can only perform its
freedom-promoting function if it is implemented so as to "serve[] the
copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public
instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for
creativity." 3°6
While fair use is of crucial importance in protecting the public
interest, many courts, as this Article has shown, have interpreted it as
merely an individual right vested in users of copyrighted works. This
individual right-based approach has led the courts to uniformly treat
fair use as an affirmative defense.
This Article argues against the individual right-based approach
to fair use. It asserts that fair use should be reconceptualized as the
public's collective right. In doing so, it introduces a new theoretical
basis for the fair use doctrine by drawing on the ideas of collective
rights and intangible public space. It shows how we can capitalize on
the collective right theory of fair use to come up with a set of new
legal approaches to defend the public interest.

305. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTAND PRIVACY 93 (2008).

306. Leval, supra note 135, at 1110.
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History has shown that fair use is a highly dynamic legal tool. It
has evolved over time and transformed with ever-changing social
conditions. 307 No matter how fair use changes, what remains
unchanged is its capacity to generate active responses and adaptations
to new public needs. Fair use as a collective right not only comports
with the public-oriented dynamism in its spirit but also reinforces its
commitment to the shared pursuit of enhanced civilization and
freedom for all humankind.

307. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1855-60 (2007)
(exploring the role of the fair use doctrine in accommodating the Google Book Print
Library); Burk & Cohen, supra note 3, at 43-47 (discussing the role of fair use in
accommodating advances in technology).

